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This paper provides empirical evidence on firm recoveries 
from financial system collapses in developing countries 
(systemic sudden stops episodes), and compares them 
with the experience in the United States in the 2008 
financial crisis. Prior research found that economies 
recover from systemic sudden stop episodes before the 
financial sector. These recoveries are called Phoenix 
miracles, and the research questioned the role of the 
financial system in recovery. Although an average of 
the macro data across a sample of systemic sudden stop 
episodes over the 1990s appears consistent with the 
notion of Phoenix recoveries, closer inspection reveals 
heterogeneity of responses across the countries, with 
This paper is a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Development Research Group. It is part of 
a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy 
discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
The author may be contacted at ademirguckunt@worldbank.org.  
only a few countries fitting the pattern. Micro data show 
that across countries, only a small fraction (less than 31 
percent) of firms follow a pattern of recovery in sales 
without a recovery in external credit, and even these firms 
have access to external sources of cash. The experience 
of firms in the United States during the 2008 financial 
crisis also suggests no evidence of credit-less recoveries. 
An examination of the dynamics of firms’ financing, 
investment and payout policies during recovery periods 
shows that far from being constrained, the firms in the 
sample are able to access long-term financing, issue 





Do Phoenix Miracles Exist?  
 
Firm-level evidence from financial crises 
 
 























Keywords: Output collapse, systemic crises, sudden stop, credit crunch 




                                                 
1 Ayyagari: School of Business, George Washington University, ayyagari@gwu.edu, Ph: 202-994-1292; Demirgüç-
Kunt: World Bank, ademirguckunt@worldbank.org, Ph: 202-473-7479; Maksimovic: Robert H. Smith School of 
Business at the University of Maryland, vmaksimovic@rhsmith.umd.edu, Ph:301-405-2125. We would like to thank 
organizers and participants at the July 2009 NBER Project on Market Institutions and Financial Market Risk for 
helpful comments and suggestions. This paper’s findings, interpretations, and conclusions are entirely those of the 




1.  Introduction 
One of the most hotly debated policy questions with respect to the 2008 global crisis is how to 
stimulate business recovery. Because the crisis started in and severely affected the financial 
sector, the conventional assumption is that the recovery of the financial sector is a precondition 
to recovery in the corporate sector. While this conjecture appears reasonable, it has been 
challenged by observers in numerous crises across the world in recent years, in which real sector 
recovery preceded that of the financial sector (e.g. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi, 2006a, 2006b; 
Claessens, Kose, and Terrones, 2009; Abiad, Dell’Aricia, and Li, 2011). Of particular interest are 
episodes characterized by Calvo et al. (2006a) as Systemic Sudden Stops (3S episodes) where 
output declines are associated with sharp declines in the liquidity of a country’s financial sector. 
These credit-less recoveries where external credit collapses with output but fails to recover as 
output bounces back to full recovery have been termed “Phoenix Miracles”.  
Empirically, 3S episodes offer an unusual natural experiment since they provide an 
opportunity to observe how firms are affected in economies which have been subjected to a 
financial shock, which precedes or is contemporaneous with a recession. To date there has been 
little evidence at the firm-level on how corporations respond to crises in general. In 3-S episodes, 
in particular, it is not known whether the proposed mechanism in Calvo et al. (2006b) actually 
drives recovery in the corporate sector or whether firms register a recovery in sales and corporate 
activity preceding a recovery in external financing after a crisis. 
The theory of Phoenix Miracles call into question many of the policies advanced to solve 
the 2008 US financial crisis since researchers have identified similarities between the US crisis 
and prior emerging market crises (e.g. Boone and Johnson, 2008; Krugman, 2009). Calvo and 
Kung (2010) label the US recovery as a new Phoenix Miracle while noting parallels between the 
US and past emerging market episodes. By contrast, Campello, Graham, Giambona, and Harvey 
(2011) and Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) use survey data to conclude that the US 
financial crisis limited but mostly did not preclude access to credit lines. 
In this paper, we use a database of listed firms in emerging markets to analyze the 
recovery process after a financing crisis. Specifically, we ask whether recovery of the financial  
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sector precedes or occurs at the same time as the recovery in output of the corporate sector? Do 
firms experience Phoenix Miracles where their sales recover without a recovery in external credit?  
We then compare and contrast the experience of the emerging market firms to that of US firms 
during the 2008 US financial crisis and investigate if the US recovery process is a Phoenix 
Miracle as suggested by recent macro studies.  
To answer these questions, we explore if the micro mechanism of the recovery process 
detailed in Calvo et al. (2006a, b) is borne out in our sample of publicly listed firms.
2 To explain 
the existence of Phoenix Miracles, Calvo et al. (2006b) propose a partial equilibrium model with 
financial frictions, where firms in developing countries can obtain short-term credit from banks 
for working capital used to finance inventory accumulation or the wage bill. In their model, bank 
credit dries up in a crisis leading to a drop in firms’ holdings of short terms assets that are 
financed by bank credit. The short term assets/output ratio does not fully adjust to permit the 
firm to produce at the same level, leading to a drop in output and investment. Over time, the 
stock of short term assets is restored by discontinuing investments and out of self-generated cash 
flows. Thus, output recovers even while bank credit hasn’t fully recovered, giving rise to the 
Phoenix Miracle.
3 
To test the model predictions and reconcile the macro evidence with micro data, we first 
use firm-level data from Bloomberg database for 9 emerging market 3S episodes over the 1990s 
– Argentina, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, Thailand, and two episodes in 
Turkey.
4 Each of the emerging market crisis episodes has also been previously identified as 
being a Phoenix Miracle, where there is a recovery in output while credit still stagnates. 
Developing countries are most likely to the meet the conditions for the existence of Phoenix 
miracles following 3S episodes  as firms in those countries are more likely to depend on short-
                                                 
2 Publicly listed firms are typically the largest firms in an economy and thus presumably driving the recovery 
process. While we are limited by the unavailability of detailed balance sheet on private firms across countries as in 
other cross-country micro studies, we are able to examine the recovery process for a sample of private firms in 
Argentina (one of the 3S episodes in our sample) and find that the pattern mirrors the public firm sample. 
3 Micro-evidence of recovery from 3S episodes are also of independent interest as  studies on economy-wide 
production and productivity forecasts (Miron and Zeldes, 1989; Bartelsman and Wolf, 2009; Young, 2009) have 
shown that micro-level evidence has more information and less measurement error than the macro data. 
4 Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004) argue that global capital market turmoil acts as a coordinating factor external 
to the emerging markets in many of the sudden stop episodes. They show that sudden stops are not a common 
feature in developed economies (83% of depreciation episodes in developed markets over the 1990s were not 
accompanied by sudden stops) since developed countries are likely to remain open during currency crises.  
4 
 
term financing and have less access to long-term financing  (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic,1999; Fan, Titman, and Twite, 2010). 
Next we use data on US listed firms from Compustat to study recovery from the 2008 
financial crisis in the US. We then compare the US experience with that of the 3S episodes. The 
comparison with emerging markets is particularly relevant since Calvo and Kung (2010) draw 
parallels between the recovery process in the US crisis and past emerging market episodes and 
suggest that the US recovery is a new Phoenix miracle. Boone and Johnson (2008) commenting 
on the 2008 US financial crisis argue that “the evolution of the current crisis seems remarkably 
similar to emerging market crises of a decade ago.”  Others (e.g. Claessens, Kose, and Terrones, 
2009) have made the case for Phoenix Miracles in developed markets as well, with Krugman 
(2009) noting the role of self-financing in the partial recovery of Japanese firms after the turn of 
the century.
5  
We have the following main findings: First, a closer look at the macro evidence suggests 
that there is heterogeneity across countries even amongst the Phoenix Miracles identified by the 
macro literature. In some countries like Thailand, there is no evidence of credit recovery even 
two periods after GDP recovery, suggesting a true Phoenix Miracle. However, some of the other 
episodes identified as Phoenix Miracles do not appear to be such even on the basis of macro 
evidence alone. For instance, while private credit lags GDP recovery by one period in most cases, 
in the instance of Korea and two crisis episodes in Turkey, private credit recovers at the same 
time as GDP calling into question whether they are truly Phoenix Miracles. In both Korea and 
the first crisis episode in Turkey in 1992-1996 (as well as in Russia though credit lags GDP 
recovery there), private credit far surpasses original credit levels before the crisis. Overall, of the 
9 crisis episodes in our sample that were identified as 3S episodes in Calvo et al. (2006a), we are 
able to identify only 6 as potential miracles and 3 as non-miracles (Korea and the two Turkey 
crisis episodes) on the basis of macro statistics alone. 
Second, we look at the existence of Phoenix Miracles at the micro level to examine if 
there is a recovery in aggregate sales without a recovery in aggregate short-term borrowing 
(according to the micro mechanism suggested by Calvo et al., 2006b). We analyze the financial 
                                                 
5 See also Calomaris, Klingebiel,and Laeven ( 2005), and Claessens, Klingebiel,and Laeven ( 2005) for  a discussion 
of the resolution of developing country crises.  
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statements of affected firms to determine their cash outflows and inflows, as in Gatchev, Pulvino, 
and Tarhan, (2010) and Dasgupta, Noe, and Wang (2011). We find that the number of potential 
miracles is further reduced. Of the 6 potential miracles identified in the macro data, only in the 
case of Argentina, Malaysia, and Thailand, do we find a recovery in corporate sales before a 
recovery in short-term borrowing. In Indonesia, we find both sales and short-term credit recover 
at the same time where as in Mexico and Russia we find that while credit begins to recovers, 
sales still hasn’t recovered, suggesting that these 3 countries are not Phoenix Miracles. Of the 3 
non-miracles identified in the macro data, the 2 crisis episodes in Turkey remain non-miracles at 
the micro level, with corporate sales and short-term credit not only moving together, but also not 
having recovered. However, Korea appears as a Phoenix miracle in the micro data with sales 
recovering before a recovery in credit markets. 
Third, we find no evidence that the US is a Phoenix Miracle. At the macro level, we find 
that GDP and Bank Credit (defined as the aggregate amount of assets held by banks excluding 
vault cash) decline in 2008 but begin to recover simultaneously in 2009. At the firm level, we 
find that both Sales and Debt in Current Liabilities (aggregated across publicly traded firms in 
Compustat) recover simultaneously, suggesting that output recovery was not credit-less. 
We then focus our analysis at the firm-level to understand the microeconomic 
foundations of what drives the recovery process in the emerging markets and the US. While the 
mechanism outlined in Calvo et al. (2006b) suggests that recovery is driven by restoring the 
stock of short term assets out of self-generated cash flows and discontinuing investments, we 
find that the recovery is not credit-less and that on average firms substitute short-term credit with 
long-term external finance either through long-term borrowing or capital issuance. Thus, these 
potential miracles are miracles in a very restricted sense, if at all, in that firms are not relying on 
short-term financing but relying on long-term financing. Thus, we find little support for the 
mechanism in Calvo et al (2006b) that firms finance themselves primarily out of cash saved from 
cutting investments following a crisis.
6  
                                                 
6 This is broadly consistent with a few of the studies (e.g. Bleakley and Cowan, 2008; 2010) that have examined 
firm investment patterns in a small sample of crisis episodes to conclude that the pattern of recovery across firms is 
not correlated with the mechanism suggested by Calvo et al. (2006b). However, there are inherent inconsistencies in 
these studies with findings that firms dependent on short-term financing engage in both involuntary restructuring at  
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Finally, we examine the investment and financing behavior of firms dealing with positive 
and adverse cash flow shocks to better understand corporate decision making during the crisis 
period and recovery. We find that both in the emerging markets fitting Calvo’s definition of 
miracles and in the US, firms use their positive cash flow shocks to add to their cash balances 
and repay short-term debt. Firms facing a negative cash flow shock and presumably financially 
constrained are still able to borrow in the long-term debt markets and issue equity, thus calling 
into question the notion of credit-less recoveries. 
Overall our results suggest that the phenomenon of Phoenix Miracles is not supported by 
the micro level data either in the emerging markets or the U.S. Even in the macro evidence, there 
is a great deal of heterogeneity in the relationship between GDP and credit recovery across the 
emerging market countries and in the US we find no evidence that there was a recovery in output 
without a recovery in credit. 
Our paper contributes to the recent emerging literature on liquidity management and 
corporate investment during the US financial crisis. Campello et al. (2011) and Campello, 
Graham, and Harvey (2010) survey CFOs and find that credit lines are an important source for 
corporate spending during a crisis and firms substitute between credit lines and internal cash 
when facing a credit shortage. They find that when firms have limited access to credit lines, they 
choose between saving and investing during the crisis but with increasing access to credit lines, 
firms with more cash also invest more. Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2010) 
find that firms with large fractions of their long-term debt maturing at the time of crisis had a 
large and significant drop in their investment. None of these papers discuss the mechanism of the 
corporate recovery process and whether or not it is in the presence of credit.  
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the data and identification of the 
sample of 3S episodes. Section 3 presents the summary statistics at the macro and micro level on 
the existence of Phoenix miracles in the 9 3S episodes in our sample. Section 4 presents a 
microeconomic foundation of the miracles in our sample. Section 5 presents findings on the US 
financing crisis of 2008. Section 6 concludes.  
                                                                                                                                                             
a loss and increasing investment during crises and the interpretation of increases in inventories in a crisis as 
voluntary increase in investment.  
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2.  Data  
2.1  3S Episodes 
The Sudden Systemic Stops (3S) identified in the macro literature are not mild recessions or 
contractions, but rather periods of output collapses of severe magnitude of about 10% from peak 
to trough. The dating and identification of 3S episodes in the macro literature follows the 
classification in Calvo et al. (2006a, b) who use a sample of emerging markets that are integrated 
in world capital markets and tracked by JP Morgan to construct its global Emerging Market 
Bond Index (EMBI). Calvo et al. (2006a, b) first characterize output collapses by a pre-crisis 
peak (period displaying the maximum level of output preceding a trough), trough (local 
minimum following the onset of a crisis) and full recovery point (period in which the pre-crisis 
peak output level is fully restored). Next they classify a 3S window as one that is marked by (a) a 
capital flow window where there is a large fall in capital flows exceeding two standard deviations 
from its mean that overlaps at any point in time with (b) an aggregate-spread window containing 
a spike in the aggregate EMBI spread exceeding two standard deviations from its mean. If either 
the pre-crisis peak or trough of a previously identified output collapse episode falls within the 3S 
window, it is classified as a 3S collapse.  
While Calvo et al. identify 22 3S collapses through the 1980s and 1990s, we are 
restricted by the availability of firm level data to 9 3S episodes over the 1990s.
7 Table 1 shows 
the 9 3S episodes in our sample, with the dates of the pre-crisis peak, crisis trough and recovery 
point as identified by Calvo et al. (2006a). While the identification of these crisis episodes 
follows the 3S classification, they coincide with large banking and currency crises over the 
1990s as identified by other studies, including Laeven and Valencia (2008). 
2.2  Identification of Phoenix Miracles 
The literature has identified Phoenix Miracles as crisis episodes where there is a collapse in both 
output and credit but output recovers relatively quickly without a recovery in credit. For our 
sample, we start with 9 3S episodes over the 1990s that have been identified as potential Phoenix 
                                                 
7 Ecuador and Morocco had 3S collapses over the 1990s but we do not have these in our sample due to the 
unavailability of corporate balance sheet data in these countries from Bloomberg. These countries are not covered in 
other firm-level datasets such as Worldscope either.  
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Miracles in Calvo et al. (2006a). We then consider each of the 9 episodes in detail and re-visit 
the GDP and macro credit numbers in each country to examine if output began to recovery 
without a recovery in credit within a two-year period after the deepest point of the crisis (the 
trough). We categorize countries as Phoenix Miracles at the macro level if GDP began to recover 
without a simultaneous recovery in credit and we classify countries as Non-Miracles at the macro 
level if both GDP and credit began to recover simultaneously.  
We categorize countries as Phoenix Miracles at the micro level if there was recovery in 
sales without a recovery in short-term borrowing (both sales and short-term borrowing 
aggregated across all firms in our sample in the country) within a two-year period after the 
deepest point of the crisis. We classify countries as Non-miracles at the micro level if either 
aggregate sales never show a recovery or both sales and short-term borrowing recover 
simultaneously within a two year period after the deepest point of the crisis. For our firm-level 
analysis, we apply the same definition to classify each individual firm as a Phoenix Miracle at 
the firm level if it experiences a recovery in sales without a recovery in credit. At the firm level 
we define credit both strictly as just short-term borrowing as well as a broader definition that 
includes short-term borrowing, long-term borrowing, and equity issuances. 
2.3  Sample Construction 
For our sample of emerging markets, we collect firm-level accounting information from 
Bloomberg for over 2500 publicly traded firms in the above 3S episodes over a five-year 
window, two years preceding the trough of the output collapse to two years after the trough. In 
identifying if the countries are Phoenix miracles at the micro level, we restrict the sample to 
firms with non-missing sales and short term borrowing over the five years. In detailed firm-level 
analysis, where we identify individual firms as Phoenix Miracles, we further restrict the sample 
to 1326 firms across 5 countries after dropping firms with key non-missing balance sheet and 
cash flow statement information for each of the five years.
8 However, all our results are robust to 
allowing the size of the sample to vary as new firms are listed and incorporated into the database. 
It may be noted that Bloomberg does not remove bankrupt or de-listed firms. In addition to 
detailed balance sheet and income statement information, we also have information on the 
                                                 
8 Our sample size is comparable to sample sizes in other studies (e.g. Bleakley and Cowan, 2008; 2010) looking at 
crisis country episodes over the 1990s.  
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exchanges on which the firm is traded, ownership, and industry classification. Bloomberg’s 
industry classification is based on the Industry Classification Benchmark.  
To examine corporate recovery, we use Net Sales defined as total operating revenue. We 
also use alternate measures including Output defined as Sales + Changes in Inventories and 
Corporate Profits computed as Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization 
(EBITDA). Our main measure of credit is Short Term Borrowings that includes bank 
overdrafts and short-term debts and borrowings.  
In our analysis of firm recoveries, we focus on both the balance sheet positions (that 
provide a snapshot of the firm’s financial resources and obligations at a given point in time) and 
the statement of cash flows which provides a breakdown of cash flows from operating, investing, 
and financing activities that helps determine the short term viability of the company. All the 
accounting variables are converted to real terms by deflating by CPI Index.  All our results are 
robust to using GDP deflator instead of CPI.  
3.  Summary Statistics on the Existence of Phoenix Miracles 
3.1  Macro Evidence 
We first focus on the behavior of GDP and private sector bank credit covering a five-year 
window centered on troughs in output, in our sample of 3S collapse episodes. GDP is the real 
GDP in constant local currency units from World Development Indicators and credit is the 
Claims on the Private Sector by Deposit Money Banks from the International Financial Statistics 
(line 22d). 
Figure 1A reproduces the picture of Phoenix Miracles from Calvo et al. (2006a) for 22 3S 
episodes where the drop in average GDP from t-2 to t was 7.8% and the drop in average credit 
was 15%. After t (the crisis trough), there is a steep V-shaped recovery in output to previous 
levels where as credit still stagnates and begins to recover only at t+1. Looking at our sample of 
nine 3S episodes over the 1990s in Figure 1B, we obtain a very similar picture. The fall in 
average GDP (bold line) and credit (dotted line) across the 9 episodes are 5.1%
9  and 16.1%, 
                                                 
9 The statistics reported in Calvo et al. (2006) are for the average 3S episode. Similarly here, the figure of 5.12% 
indicating fall in average output differs from the average fall in output across all 9 episodes which is 8.2%. The 
average fall in credit across 8 episodes (we exclude Korea since there was no drop in credit) is 35%.  
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respectively, and GDP recovery precedes recovery in private credit by one whole period. Thus 
the macro evidence in our sample of crisis episodes is consistent with the aggregate evidence 
presented in Calvo et al. (2006a) that while output and credit collapse together, output recovers 
to pre-crisis levels without a similar recovery in credit, giving rise to the Phoenix Miracle.  
The aggregate data however mask a great deal of heterogeneity at the country level. Once 
we look at individual country episodes in Figure 2, we find that some of the potential Phoenix 
Miracle countries do not appear to be miracles, in that, output (bold line) recovery does not 
precede credit (dotted line) recovery. Thus, based on the macro statistics for each country, we 
can classify the 9 country episodes into (a) Phoenix Miracles at the Macro level where credit 
recovers a whole period (or even later) after GDP recovery as in the case of Argentina, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, and Thailand (see Figure 2A) and (b) Non-Miracles at the Macro 
level where both GDP and credit recover at the same time as in the case of Korea and the two 
episodes in Turkey (see Figure 2B). 
Even within each of these categories, we see stark variation in the credit patterns. In the 
Phoenix Miracles category (figure 2A), we see that in Thailand, credit doesn’t begin to recover 
even two periods after recovery in GDP. In the case of most of the other episodes, while credit 
begins to recover, it does not reach pre-crisis levels even after two periods.
10 In the case of 
Russia however, while credit recovers with a one-period lag after output, within a period 
thereafter it far exceeds pre-crisis levels. Similarly, among the Non-Miracles category where 
credit and GDP recover at the same time, we see that in the case of Korea and the first crisis 
episode in Turkey, credit levels on recovery far exceed the pre-crisis levels. Note that the above 
breakdown of countries into Phoenix Miracles and Non Miracles is based entirely on macro 
statistics and in the next section we take a closer look at these categories using firm-level data. 
There is also substantial variation in the magnitude of GDP and credit collapses across 
the countries. Table 2 shows the drop in GDP and credit over the 5-year window surrounding the 
crisis trough reported in Table 1.
11 In the case of the Phoenix Miracles, over the five-year 
window surrounding the trough, GDP drops range from 5% in the case of Russia to 15% in the 
                                                 
10 Except in the case of Russia and the non-miracle countries, credit doesn’t reach pre-crisis peak levels even by the 
full recovery point of GDP detailed in Table 1. 
11 The drop is computed between the pre-trough peak and the local minimum in the five-year window.  
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case of Argentina. Credit collapses range from 10% in the case of Malaysia to 69% in the case of 
Indonesia. In the case of Thailand, GDP drops by 12% and credit drops by 38%. In the non-
miracles case, output drop ranges between 3% in Turkey to 7% in the case of South Korea and 
while Korea shows no drop in private sector credit, the two episodes in Turkey register credit 
drops of 17% and 33%, respectively. 
3.2  Micro Evidence 
3.2.1  Sales versus GDP Recovery 
In this sub-section, we first examine whether corporate sales tracks recovery in GDP. Figure 3A 
shows the behavior of corporate sales (dotted line) along with GDP (bold line) over the period t-
2 to t+2. Interestingly we find that while GDP recovers at t and returns to pre-crisis levels by t+2, 
we find that recovery in sales begins a whole period later at t+1 and does not return to pre-crisis 
levels. The drop in average corporate sales across the nine 3S episodes is a 43% compared to the 
8% drop in GDP across the same set of crisis episodes.
12 Figure 3B shows the relation between 
sales and GDP from 6 periods before the crisis to four periods after the crisis. The figure reveals 
that across the countries aggregate firm sales tracks GDP closely except during the crisis 
period.
13   
In Figure 3C we explore other measures of corporate output including Sales-COGs, 
profitability as measured by EBITDA, and profitability adjusted for wages or EBITDA + 
Wages
14 and find a similar one period lag between GDP recovery and corporate output recovery. 
As in other cross-country micro studies, we are restricted to examining the micro data for public 
firms since detailed balance sheet data on private firms across countries is unavailable. However, 
we were able to obtain operating revenue on a sample of private firms (156 firms with non-
missing data over 10 years) in Argentina from the ORBIS database.
 15 In Figure 3D, we examine 
                                                 
12 It may be noted that our micro level analysis is focused only on the corporate sector (largely manufacturing firms) 
while the GDP numbers reflect other sectors of the economy and not just the corporate sector. 
13 Figure 3B does not include Russia and Turkey because the firm-level data do not allow us to go back six years 
before the crisis. 
14 A description of the construction of national income statistics from the International Financial Statistics reveals 
that sales from commercial income statements are adjusted for changes in output inventories and work in progress to 
measure production. The components of inventory are not well populated in the Bloomberg database and so we use 
other approximations of production. 
15We used the 2009 version of ORBIS data which goes back ten years to 1999. Hence we are unable to replicate the 
private firm analysis for the other 3S countries since the crises periods are before 1999.  
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the relation between GDP and corporate sales for just the private firms and find a similar pattern 
as before – corporate sales begin to recover one period after GDP recovery.
 All our results hold 
when we restrict the sample to firms with fiscal year ends in December.  
Once we disaggregate across countries in Figure 4, we again find a great deal of 
heterogeneity. In Figure 4A, when we look at the set of countries where the macro data showed a 
Phoenix Miracle, we find that sales (dotted line) begins to recover simultaneously with GDP 
(bold line) as in the case of Thailand or one to three periods after GDP recovery as in the case of 
Argentina, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, and Russia. However the sales and GDP patterns do not 
appear to be correlated at all in the case of the Non-Miracle countries – Korea and the two 
Turkey episodes (see Figure 4B). In the case of Korea there is no drop in sales during the crisis 
period and in the case of Turkey’s two crisis episodes, aggregate sales does not seem to recover 
even three periods after GDP recovery. While we previously classified Korea and the two 
Turkey episodes as Non-miracles at the aggregate level since GDP and credit recovered 
simultaneously, Figure 4B suggests that micro data also point towards them being non-miracles. 
We discuss this in greater detail in section 3.2.2. 
In addition to the robustness checks in Figures 3B-3D, we undertake several other checks 
to understand whether statistical issues or sample selection issues are driving the discrepancy 
between recovery in economy-wide GDP versus corporate sales. First, we find that our results 
are robust to restricting the sample to firms with fiscal year ends in Dec 31
st ( <15% of our 
sample of firms have fiscal year ends before Dec 31
st) suggesting that our results are not driven 
by timing issues related to the reporting of balance sheet information.
16 Second, our results are 
also robust to not restricting the sample to firms with all five years of data on sales or output 
suggesting that our results are not driven by sample selection issues associated with firms 
entering and leaving the database.  
To explore whether our results are driven by discrepancies in official reported GDP 
statistics, we look at two other measures - value added in the manufacturing sector from World 
Development Indicators and electric power consumption. Several economists including Dobozi 
and Pohl (1995) have argued that electric power consumption data are a more reliable indicator 
                                                 
16 We prefer to use annual data instead of quarterly data since the coverage of firms is better in the annual 
Bloomberg file. However, our results are robust to using quarterly data rather than annual data.   
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of overall short-run economic activity than official GDP statistics which may be biased due to 
any number of reasons including under-reporting of output by enterprises (to avoid taxes) and 
old reporting systems used by statistical offices.  We find that the GDP troughs identified in the 
crisis episodes coincide with troughs in manufacturing value added and in power consumption, 
though the power consumption data do not exhibit a collapse as large as that of the GDP.  
While we find no evidence that the GDP statistics are not representative, several papers 
have suggested that there may be statistical measurement error in computing macro numbers. For 
instance, Bartelsman and Wolf (2009) show that productivity forecasts using micro data are more 
accurate and better than the macro alternative. Miron and Zeldes (1989) examine two measures 
of monthly manufacturing production – the index of industrial production and a second measure 
constructed from the accounting identity that output is given by the sum of sales and changes in 
inventories and find several discrepancies. They conclude substantial measurement error exists in 
the macro (industry level) price indices as compared to those constructed from micro data. 
Similar discrepancies between macro-level and household consumption data in national account 
statistics have been noted by Ravallion (2003) and Young (2009). Hence the need for examining 
the recovery process from a crisis using detailed firm-level data.  
3.2.2   Sales versus Credit Recovery 
In this section we examine if we observe the phenomenon of Phoenix Miracles at the micro-level 
by looking at the recovery in corporate sales and short-term borrowing. In Figure 5A we present 
averages across the 9 episodes and find that there does not seem to be any evidence of a Phoenix 
Miracle. Both Sales (bold line) and Short Term Borrowing (dotted line) recover simultaneously 
albeit one period after GDP recovery.  
When we start looking at individual countries, we can split the crisis episodes into two 
main categories: (a) Phoenix Miracles at the Micro Level: This is the case of Argentina, 
Malaysia, Korea and Thailand (see Figure 5B) where we see that corporate sales (in real terms) 
recovers at t+1 in each case while short term borrowing (also in real terms) has still not 
recovered. While Argentina, Malaysia, and Thailand were also identified as macro miracles in 
section 3.1, Korea was not identified as a miracle at the macro level since GDP and Private 
Credit recovered simultaneously. However the micro evidence in Korea shows that sales recover  
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before short term credit. (b) Non-Miracles at the Micro level: This is the case of the following 5 
episodes - Mexico, Indonesia, Russia and the two Turkey episodes – where there is no credit-less 
recovery. We can further split the non-miracles into Phoenix Miracles only at the Macro level 
and Non-Miracles at the Macro and Micro levels. The macro evidence based on GDP and 
Private Credit in section 4.1 showed Phoenix Miracles at the macro level in Mexico, Indonesia, 
and Russia. However, as seen in Figure 5C, in each of these countries both Sales and Short Term 
Borrowing recover at the same time (at t+1 in the case of Indonesia and Russia and t+3 in the 
case of Mexico). In both the Turkey episodes (see Figure 5D), we find that both corporate sales 
and credit collapse during the crisis and show no signs of recovery even two periods after GDP 
recovery. 
To summarize the results from sections 3.1 and 3.2, based on just the macro data, we 
could categorize only 6 of the 9 3S episodes as potential Phoenix Miracles. When we look at 
firm-level data aggregated up to the country level, we find that only 4 of the 9 3S episodes 
appear to be Phoenix miracles where corporate sales recover before a recovery in short-term 
borrowing. 
4.  Microeconomic Foundations of Phoenix Miracles 
4.1  Identification of Firm-level Miracles 
In this section, we disaggregate our analysis to the firm level to first identify how many firms 
recover in each of the economies and then to identify firms that may be classified as potential 
miracles. We next focus on their balance sheet and cash flow statements over the two periods 
following the trough of the crisis. Since we are aggregating across all firms in the economy, we 
use a balanced sample of firms with key non-missing balance sheet and cash flow statement 
data
17 in each of the five years from two years before the crisis (t-2) to two years after the crisis 
(t+2). We also drop firms in the Utilities and Finance sector (Banks, Insurance, and Financial 
Services) and any erroneous observations such as negative sales or total assets. This leaves us 
                                                 
17 Our sample is restricted to non-missing values of the following variables from t-2 to t+2 : Sales (Income 
Statement), Short-term borrowing (Balance Sheet) and the following Cash Flow Statement variables -  dividends, 
increase/decrease in short-term borrowing, increases in long-term borrowing, decreases in long-term borrowing, 
increases in capital stock, decreases in capital stock, increase in investments, decrease in investment, disposal of 
fixed assets, capital expenditures, cash from financing activities, cash from investing activities, and cash from 
operations, and cash from other financing activities.  
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with a sample of 214 firms in Indonesia, 289 firms in Korea, 76 firms in Mexico, 474 firms in 
Malaysia, and 273 firms in Thailand. We have no observations in Argentina, Russia, and Turkey 
because the cash flow statements in Bloomberg for these countries for our sample period are not 
populated.  
In Table 3, we first identify the percentage of firms that had a recovery in sales over a 
two year period in each economy in panel A and then identify potential credit-less recoveries 
(Phoenix miracles) in each economy in panel B. First, consider the two year internal from t to 
t+2. If ΔSt+1 is the change in sales from t to t+1 and ΔSt+2 is the change in sales from t to t+2, 
output over the two year period is given by  
ΔS = ΔSt+1 + ΔSt+2  (1) 
If we were to define firms that recover as those that had a positive change in sales over 
the two period i.e. ΔS  > 0, panel A of Table 3 shows that in our sample of 1326 firms across the 
5 countries, only 57% of the firms had a recovery in sales. The percentage of firms that had a 
positive change in sales is higher (61.39%) in the micro miracle countries (aggregate sales 
recovering before a recovery in short term credit). In the non-miracle countries, in Indonesia 
where aggregate sales and credit begin to recover simultaneously, 50.47% of the firms have a 
recovery in sales where as in Mexico where there is no recovery in aggregate sales, only 9.21% 
of the firms show a positive change in sales over the two period. Thus, panel A tells us that 
across the five 3S episodes for which we have firm-level data, a large percentage of firms do not 
have a recovery in sales at all. Even in the episodes that can be classified as micro miracles, 
nearly 40% of the firms had no recovery in sales. 
To identify phoenix miracles, we focus on firms that have had a recovery in sales from t 
to t+2 without a recovery in external credit over the same period. We use two definitions of 
external credit. First, in Panel B1, we define external financing by the amount of short-term debt 
financing over the two-year period. Thus, analogous to equation (1), we have: 
ΔL1 = ΔSTDt+1 + ΔSTDt+2  (2) 
where ΔSTDt+1 is the cash flow from net changes in short term borrowing reported on the cash 
flow statement at t+1 and ΔSTDt+2 is the cash flow from net changes in short term borrowing at  
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t+2. So over the two periods, Phoenix Miracles are those firms that had ΔS > 0 with ΔL1 ≤  0. In 
Panel B2, we define external financing by changes in short-term borrowing, long-term borrowing, 
net capital stock issuance, and net cash flow from other financing activities.
 18  So we have: 
ΔL2 = ΔL1 + ΔLTDt+1 + ΔLTDt+2 + ΔCSt+1 + ΔCSt+2 + ΔOFINt+1 + ΔOFINt+2  (3) 
where ΔLTDt+1 and ΔLTDt+2  are the net changes in long term borrowing reported on the cash 
flow statement at t+1 and t+2, respectively, ΔCSt+1 and ΔCSt+2 are the net capital stock issuances 
reported on the cash flow statement at t+1 and t+2, respectively, and ΔOFINt+1 and ΔOFINt+2 are 
the cash flows from other financing activities at t+1 and t+2, respectively. 
Panel B1 of Table 3 shows that across the 5 countries in our sample, the percentage of 
firms that can be classified as Phoenix Miracles varies from 7.89% in Mexico (identified as a 
Macro miracle but not a Micro miracle since there was no recovery in aggregate sales from t to 
t+2) to 45.33% in Korea (a Micro miracle but not a Macro miracle). Across the 5 3S episodes, 
we find that only 37.03% of the firms can be classified as Phoenix Miracles, thus suggesting that 
less than half the sample can be classified as miracles since they recovered in the absence of 
short-term borrowing. Of the remaining we find that 19.61% of the firms had a recovery in sales 
and short-term borrowing, 13.20% had no recovery in sales but a recovery in short-term 
borrowing (suggesting that these firms may have faced a demand shock), and 30.17% of the 
firms had no recovery in either sales or short-term borrowing. 
Panel B2 shows that when we expand the definition of external financing, the percentage 
of Phoenix Miracles across the 5 episodes drops to 30.44% (from 37.03% in panel B1). The 
largest percentage of Phoenix Miracles is 41.76% in Thailand (identified as both a Macro and 
Micro Miracle), but even here, the percentage of Phoenix miracles drops from 44.69% when we 
define external financing narrowly as short-term financing, to 41.76% when we define external 
financing to also include long-term borrowing, capital stock issuance and other financing 
activities. While the percentage of Phoenix Miracles goes down, the percentage of firms that had 
a recovery in sales and credit goes up by the same amount as expected. Furthermore, with this 
                                                 
18 In Bloomberg, cash flow from other financing includes any financing activities not already included as a portion 
of Dividends Paid, increases/decreases in short-term borrowing, increases/decreases in long-term borrowings, 
increases/decreases in capital stock. It includes foreign exchange adjustments, changes in minority interests, and 
financing costs.  
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expanded definition of external financing, the percentage of firms that had no recovery in sales 
or credit goes down from 30.17% to 27.30% while the percentage of firms that had no recovery 
in sales but a recovery in credit goes up from 13.20% to 16.06%. Overall, from panels B1 and B2 
we see that even in the countries that seemed to be potential Phoenix Miracles when we looked 
at aggregated micro-level data (Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand), we find evidence that many 
firms had access to long-term debt financing and were able to issue equity.  
4.2  Alternate Sources of Credit  
In panel C, we focus on the different accounts in a firm’s statement of cash flow position to 
examine if the firms in our sample had alternate sources of cash. Specifically in panel C1, in 
addition to the external sources of financing defined in equation (3), we include dividends paid,  
cash generated from disposal of fixed assets, and cash spent on net investments, capital 
expenditures, and acquisitions and other investing activities. 
ΔL3 = ΔL2+ ΔDIVt+1 + ΔDIVt+2 + ΔINVt+1 + ΔINVt+2  (4) 
where ΔDIVt+1 and ΔDIVt+2  are the dividends paid at t+1 and t+2, respectively, ΔINVt+1 and 
ΔINVt+2 are the total cash from the sources and uses of investing activities (includes disposal of 
fixed assets, capital expenditures, net investments (increase in investments – sale of investments) 
and other investing activities(includes acquisitions)). In Panel C2, we add in cash flow from 
operations. So we have: 
ΔL4 = ΔL3+ ΔOPERt+1 + ΔOPERt+2  (5) 
where ΔOPERt+1 and ΔOPERt+2  are the cash flow from operations at t+1 and t+2, respectively.  
Across the 5 3S episodes, we find that the percentage of firms that had a recovery in sales 
without a recovery in credit (that is firms that were previously identified as candidate Phoenix 
Miracles) reduces to 7.84% in panel C1 and further to a mere 1.73% when we include cash flow 
from operations in panel C2. The percentage of firms that have a recovery in sales and credit in 
now 54.90% and only 3.39% of the firms have no recovery in either sales or credit. The 
remaining (39.97%) firms experience no recovery in sales despite having positive credit over the 
two year period.   
18 
 
To summarize, Table 3 shows that even in the countries that have been identified as 
Phoenix Miracles based on macro statistics and aggregate sales and credit, the vast majority of 
firms that recover in these countries do so while obtaining external financing primarily from 
long-term debt and/or capital stock issuance. Furthermore, these firms continue to spend on 
capital expenditures and other investments and have positive cash flow from operating activities 
suggesting that they are not liquidity constrained. Once we account for the alternate sources of 
cash, a very small percentage (3.39%) are identified as not having recovered in sales and credit 
and an even smaller percentage (<2%) as having recovered in sales without a positive net credit 
position over the two periods.  
4.3  Dynamics of Firms’ Financing and Investment Decisions 
In this section, we take a closer look at the dynamics of the financing and investment decisions 
of the firms during the entire crisis period. Following Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010) and 
Dasgupta, Noe, and Wang (2011), we use an empirical model that allows us to examine how a 
cash flow shock can affect firms’ investment, financing, and distribution decisions jointly, 
subject to the accounting identity that sources of cash equal uses of cash. Say a firm experiences 
a one dollar increase in operating cash flow. This incremental cash flow could be used to 
increase capital expenditures or pay down debt or increase shareholder dividends or make any 
combination of investment and financing decisions that result in a net response of one dollar. 
That is, given the accounting identity that sources of cash equal uses of cash, the following 
should hold: 
Capext + Other Investments (including Acquisitions)t + ΔCasht + Dividendst + Repurchasest - 
Asset Salest - ΔSTDt  - ΔLTDt - EQUISSt - Other Financingt ≡ Cashflowt  (6) 
Consider then the following system of ten equations describing firms’ investment (capital 
expenditures, asset sales, other investments), financing (short-term debt issuance, long-term debt 
issuance, equity issuance, changes in cash positions, other financing), and distribution (dividends, 
share repurchases) decisions as a function of operating cash flow and a set of control variables:  
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ΔCapexi,t       = a1,i + b1 OCFi,t + c1 Xi,t + e1,i,t       
Other Investmentsi,t      = a2,i + b2 OCFi,t + c2 Xi,t + e2,i,t       
-Asset Salesi,t       = a3,i + b3 OCFi,t + c3 Xi,t + e3,i,t       
-ΔSTDi,t        = a4,i + b4 OCFi,t + c4 Xi,t + e4,i,t           (7) 
-ΔLTDi,t        = a5,i + b5 OCFi,t + c5 Xi,t + e5,i,t       
-Equityi,t        = a6,i + b6 OCFi,t + c6 Xi,t + e6,i,t       
ΔCashi,t        = a7,i + b7 OCFi,t + c7 Xi,t + e7,i,t       
-Other Financingi,t       = a8,i + b8 OCFi,t + c8 Xi,t + e8,i,t       
Dividendi,t        = a9,i + b9 OCFi,t + c9 Xi,t + e9,i,t       
Repurchasesi,t       = a10,i + b10 OCFi,t + c10 Xi,t + e10,i,t       
where OCF is Operating Cash Flow from the Statement of Cash Flows (net of working capital 
accruals as suggested by Bushman et al., 2007). The operating cash flow variable and all the 
dependent variables are scaled by lagged value of Total Assets. X is a set of control variables and 
includes Tobin’s Q as a measure of investment opportunities, and an initial Firm Size dummy, 
that takes the value 1 if total assets was greater than or equal to the median assets in the country 
in year t-2, and 0 otherwise. All the independent and dependent variables in the system are 
de-meaned to account for firm level fixed effects. The Data Appendix provides a detailed 
description of each of the variables and from where they are derived. 
By virtue of the sources-equal-uses constraint in (6), the cash flow coefficients should 
add up to unity and the coefficients of all other variables should sum to 0. That is, if OCFt which 
is a source of cash increases by one dollar, other sources of cash must decline by a dollar, the 
uses of cash must increase by one dollar or some combination of the different sources and uses 
of cash must account for the one dollar increase in operating cash flow. Tobin’s Q and size 
dummy are exogenous to the system so the total response across the system of equations to any 
change in these variables must sum to zero. So we have: 
Σ bi = 1  (8) 
Σ ci = 0  (9) 
Empirically, we estimate (7) as a system of seemingly unrelated regression models 
subject to the constraint that across equations,
19 cash flow coefficients sum to one and all other 
                                                 
19 Note that the seemingly unrelated regression models (SUREG) are similar to fitting the models separately using 
OLS when we use the same set of right-hand-side variables in all equations. We prefer the SUREG estimation since  
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coefficients sum to zero. For ease of interpretation of the coefficient estimates, we do not 
multiply the source variables (Asset Sales, ΔSTD, ΔLTD, Equity, Other Financing) by minus 
one and instead, equivalently multiply their corresponding cash flow coefficients by minus one 
when the defining the constraints in (8) and (9). Since we are interested in the individual cash 
flow sensitivities in each period, we estimate equation (7) by also including three time dummies, 
for the crisis period (t) and the two recovery years (t+1 and t+2), and interaction of the cash flow 
variable with each of the time dummies. Thus, if i1 is the  coefficient of OCFi,t x time t dummy, 
i2 is the  coefficient of OCFi,t x time t+1 dummy, and i3 is the  coefficient of OCF i,t x time t+2 
dummy, equation (8) may be re-written as: 
Σ (bi + i1) = 1 
Σ (bi + i2) = 1  (10) 
Σ (bi + i3) = 1 
In Table 4, we present the results of the SUREG estimation. We report the combined 
effect of the cash flow coefficients and the interaction terms to allow ease of interpretation. The 
system is estimated on the sample of countries that can be exogenously identified as miracles 
using the macro classification – Indonesia, Mexico, Malaysia, and Thailand. We remove the top 
and bottom 1% outliers for all the variables in the system. Furthermore, we allow for asymmetry 
in firms’ reactions to positive versus negative cash flow shocks by estimating equation (7) on 
two separate sub-samples of firms with positive operating cash flows (panel A) and firms with 
negative operating cash flows (panel B). Note that the interpretation of the signs of the negative 
cash flow coefficients will be inverse that of the interpretation of the positive cash flow 
coefficients. So for instance, if a firm facing a positive cash flow has a capital expenditure 
coefficient of +0.296 this would mean the firm is spending 29.6 cents on capital expenditures out 
of a $1 positive cash flow shock. On the other hand, if a firm facing a negative cash flow has a 
capital expenditure coefficient of -0.296 this would again mean the firm is spending 29.6 cents 
on capital expenditure.   
When we look at the firms with positive operating cash flows, panel A shows that before 
the crisis (that is in the years t-2 and t-1), a $1 increase in cash flow is associated with an 
                                                                                                                                                             




increase in cash balances by 40.7 cents, an increase in capital expenditures by 10.7 cents, and an 
increase in other investments (includes net long-term investments and acquisitions) by 18.9 cents. 
The $1 cash flow shock is also associated with decrease in long-term debt by 8.9 cents, decrease 
in short-term debt by 21.1 cents, increase in equity issuances by 4 cents, and decrease in other 
financing by 2.7 cents. Thus, during the pre-crisis period we see that when there is a positive one 
dollar shock in cash flow, the use variables increase by $0.707 (=0.407+0.107+0.189+0.006-
0.001) and other sources variables decrease by $0.293 (= -0.006-0.089-0.211+0.04-0.027) thus 
summing the response across the system (Uses-Sources) to one dollar.  
When we look at the dynamics of cash flow sensitivities we see that firms continue to add 
to their cash balances during the crisis (44.5 cents) and recovery periods (42 cents in T+1 and 
48.8 cents in T+2) out of every dollar increase in cash flow. The firms also continue their 
investing activities though the levels are lower than the pre-crisis investing levels. During the 
crisis, out of every $1 cash flow shock, firms invest 9.5 cents in capital expenditures and 15.7 
cents in other investments. During the recovery period in the first year (T+1), a $1 increase in 
cash flow is associated with an increase in capital expenditures by 15.6 cents and other 
investments by 17.6 cents and in year T+2 the corresponding numbers are 26 cents and 15.4 
cents. A dollar increase in cash flow is associated with a decrease in dividends of 1.8 cents in T, 
an increase in dividends by 1.3 cents in T+1 and 5.4 cents in T+2. There is also a significant 
decline in asset sales of 1.2 cents in T and 1.4 cents in T+1. 
Focusing on the financing positions, we see that during the crisis and recovery periods, in 
general increases in cash flow are associated with a decrease in short-term debt. Specifically, a 
1$ increase in cash flow is associated with a decrease in short-term debt of 19.1 cents in T, 18.7 
cents in T+1 and 7.9 cents in T+2. The firms facing positive cash flow shocks also have a 
reduction in long-term debt in the pre-crisis years of 8.9 cents and in the crisis year of 8.6 cents. 
A $1 increase in cash flow is also associated with a reduction in other financing by 2.7 cents in 
pre-crisis years, 3.7 cents in T, and 2.5 cents in T+1.  
Panel C shows the sum of the cash flow coefficients across the sources and uses as well 
as across the investment and financing variables separately. As expected the sum of the cash 
flow sensitivities across the Uses of Cash minus the sum of the cash flow sensitivities across the  
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Sources of Cash sum up to $1. Overall, we find that the absolute magnitude of the investment 
cash flow sensitivities dominate the financing cash flow sensitivities for the firms in our sample 
having positive cash flow shocks in most years except the crisis year 
In Panel B of Table 4 we examine the cash flow sensitivities of firms facing adverse cash 
flow shocks. Note that since the cash flows are negative the interpretation of the coefficients is 
reversed so that a positive sign indicates a decrease and a negative sign indicates an increase. 
First during the pre-crisis period, we find that firms facing an adverse cash flow shock reduce 
their cash balances by 10.3 cents, increase capital expenditures by 9.8 cents and decrease other 
investments by 8 cents. They also have an increase in dividends of 1.5 cents. Interestingly, 
decreases in cash flow are associated with an increase in long-term borrowing by 20.7 cents, 
increase in short-term debt by 46 cents, increase in other financing by 4 cents and increase in 
equity issuances by 21.8 cents. 
During the crisis year T, firms facing an adverse cash flow shock continue to deplete their 
cash balances by 23.8 cents, borrow 26.4 cents in long-term debt, 24.4 cents in short-term debt 
and issue 26 cents in equity when facing a $1 shortfall in cash flow. During the recovery period 
T+1, decreases in cash flow are associated with reduction in cash balances by 19.8 cents, 
increase in long-term debt by 54.4 cents and an increase in short-term debt by 26 cents. During 
T+2, cash flow shortfalls are associated with reduction in cash balances by 37.6 cents, increase in 
equity issuance by 24.2 cents and increase in other financing by 8.1 cents. Panel C shows that for 
the sample of firms facing adverse cash flow shocks the absolute magnitude of the financing-
cash flow sensitivities dominate that of the investment cash flow sensitivities. 
In summary, we find that during a 3S episode and subsequent recovery, the emerging 
market firms in our sample with positive operating cash flow shocks repay their short-term debt 
and firms with adverse cash flow shocks increase their external borrowing and equity issuances.  
5.  2008/09 US Financial Crisis  
In this section, we take a closer at the 2008 US financial crisis to investigate if the data shows a 
Phoenix Miracle in the US economy as suggested by Calvo and Kung (2010), where real 
economic activity recovers before a recovery in the credit markets. The comparison with 
emerging markets is particularly relevant since recently Boone and Johnson (2008) have argued  
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that “the evolution of the current crisis seems remarkably similar to emerging market crises of a 
decade ago.” Krugman (2009) also notes the role of self-financing in the partial recovery of 
Japanese firms after the turn of the century. In addition, while the Phoenix Miracles have largely 
been an emerging market phenomena (Calvo et al., 2004), more recent studies (e.g. Claessens, 
Kose, and Terrones, 2009; World Economic Outlook, April 2009) have documented a recovery 
in output ahead of a recovery in credit in recessions and credit crunches even in OECD countries.  
5.1  Output versus Credit Recovery – US Case 
In Figure 6A, we present the macro statistics on US-GDP and credit markets since 2005. The 
GDP numbers are seasonally adjusted real GDP estimates from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. As a measure of credit, we use Bank Credit from the Federal Reserve Board’s 
statistical release H.8 on the Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the US. Bank Credit 
consists of the aggregate amount of assets held by all US commercial banks and includes both 
securities held by banks and loans and leases made by banks.
20 We use the December numbers 
each year from the H8 release which is in monthly data format. Figure 6A shows that both GDP 
and Bank Credit decline from 2008 to 2009 but begin to recover from 2009 to 2010. The drop in 
GDP from 2008 to 2009 was 2.63% whereas the change in GDP from 2009 to 2010 was 2.85%. 
Bank Credit dropped by 3.78% from December 2008 to December 2009 but showed a positive 
increase of 2.15% from December 2009 to December 2010.  
Next, we look at US firm-level data to understand if we see similar effects in the 
corporate sector. Using annual financial statements from Compustat for US publicly listed 
companies, in Figure 6B, we present evidence on sales and short-term borrowing, aggregated 
across all firms. In constructing the sample, we drop Canadian listings that are included as part of 
the Compustat U.S. domestic file, firms incorporated outside the U.S., ADRs, and financial 
services (NAICS 52 or SIC industries 60-64 and 67) resulting in a balanced panel of 3338 firms 
that had non-missing Sales (Income Statement data item #12) and Debt in Current Liabilities 
                                                 
20 As alternate measures we also use Loans and Leases by Commercial Banks, Commercial and Industrial Loans, 
and Consumer Loans. Loans and Leases by Commercial Banks is a sub-category of Bank Credit and includes 
Commercial and Industrial Loans, Real Estate Loans, Consumer Loans, Fed Funds, Repurchase Agreements with 
Brokers and other loans; Commercial and Industrial Loans is the corporate lending sub-component of Loans and 
Leases by Commercial Banks.   
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(Balance Sheet data item #34) reported over the six year period from 2005 to 2010.
21 Figure 6B 
shows that both sales and short-term debt begin to recover in 2009. In our sample, the aggregate 
sales dropped by 12.15% from 2008 to 2009 but increased by 9.69% from 2009 to 2010. Debt in 
current liabilities, on the other hand, dropped by 28.88% from 2008 to 2009 and recovered by 
3.94% from 2009 to 2010.  
In unreported runs, we examine alternate measures of output at the firm level including 
Sales adjusted for Changes in total inventories, Sales adjusted for changes in finished-goods 
inventories and work in progress inventories, profitability as measured by earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), and EBITDA adjusted for selling and 
general administrative expenses. In all instances, we find that output recovers in 2009 reaching 
pre-crisis levels of 2008 in 2010 in most cases. Overall, from Figures 6A and 6B we see that both 
output and credit in the US begin to recover simultaneously in 2009 although short-term credit 
levels are far below their pre-crisis peaks in 2008.  
In Table 5, we present a detailed firm-level analysis using Compustat to understand how 
many firms recover and in how many cases recovery is in the absence of credit, suggesting 
potential phoenix miracles. In panel A of Table 5 we see that during the crisis period from 2008 
to 2009, only 32.65% of firms had a positive increase in sales while 64.08% of firms had a 
decline in sales. By contrast during 2009 to 2010, 69.38% of the firms in our sample had a 
positive increase in sales and only 27.17% of the firms had a decline in sales. In unreported logit 
regressions, we find that the firms who had a positive increase in sales tend to be larger firms, in 
manufacturing (SIC codes 20-39), and with lower pre-crisis (in 2007) levels of short-term and 
long-term debt. 
In panel B of Table 5 we repeat our analysis of Table 3 for the sample US firms using 
different measures of changes in financing as reported on the Balance Sheet and Statement of 
Cash Flows in Compustat. The Data Appendix provides details on how each of the variables is 
                                                 
21 The Compustat data download was in July 2011. So we may be missing data on some firms that have fiscal year 
ends in January-May2011 (which would count as fiscal year 2010 data) that may not have been updated in 
Compustat. Hence, we use a balanced sample because we are looking at aggregate sales and debt figures in the 
economy and we don’t want the year to year variation to be biased by non-missing data. However, to ensure that our 
results do not change if we were to include the non-missing data we re-do our analysis using quarterly statement 
data and do find a recovery in sales across all the firms in second quarter of 2009.   
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constructed. When we use changes in short-term borrowing (Balance Sheet data item #34) as a 
measure of credit, we find 45.63% of our sample to be Phoenix Miracles – these firms had a 
positive increase in sales without a positive increase in short-term borrowing from 2009 to 
2010.
22 Even amongst these candidate Phoenix Miracles, we find that 90% (unreported in the 
table) of the firms had an adequate cash balance in their balance sheet to cover their liquidity 
crunch. That is, the ratio of the absolute value of changes in short-term borrowing from 2009 to 
2010 to their balance sheet Cash and Short-term Investments position in 2010, was <1 for 90% 
of the firms. When we look at the firms that are not candidate miracles, 27.2% of the firms had a 
positive increase in sales and short-term borrowing, 9.29% had a decline in sales but an increase 
in short-term borrowing and 17.88% of firms had a decline in sales and short-term borrowing. 
The percentage of Phoenix Miracles is reduced to 8.96% when we consider the changes 
in Long-term Debt (Balance Sheet data item #9), Net Capital Stock Issuance (Sale of Common 
and Preferred Stock, data item #108 – Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock, data item 
#115), Cash from Dividends (Cash Dividends, data item #127), and Other Financing activities 
(Financing Activities-Other, data item #312). And of these firms, 59% (unreported in the table) 
had adequate cash balances to cover their liquidity crunch. 
In Panel C we examine the different accounts in the Statement of Cash flows to identify 
alternate sources of liquidity for the firms during the recovery period. First, we re-define credit to 
not only include net financing from changes in short-term debt, long-term debt, equity issuances, 
and other financing activities but also cash from other sources such as that which could have 
been saved by cutting dividends, capital expenditures, and acquisitions. Specifically, when we 
include cash that could have been generated by cutting Dividends (data item #21), Capital 
Expenditures (data item #128), Net Investments (Sale of Investments data item #109-Increase in 
Investments data item #113), Changes in Short-term Investments (data item #309) and Other 
Investing Activities (data item #310) and cash generated from Sale of Property, Plant and 
Equipment (data item #107) and Acquisitions (data item #129), we find that the percentage of 
candidate phoenix miracles in our sample decreases to 5.54%. This further reduces to 2.76% (92 
firms out of 3338) once we include the Cash Flow from Operating Activities (data item #308). 
                                                 
22 We prefer to use the balance sheet data for constructing changes in short-term and long-term borrowing over 
2009-2010 because the corresponding items in the Statement of cash flows are missing for a large portion of the 
sample.   
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Even among these 92 firms, 53% (unreported in the table) had a sufficient cash balance to cover 
their liquidity crunch. Thus, a very small percentage of the firms in the US sample had a positive 
increase in sales from 2009 to 2010 while the overall change in credit (short-term debt, long-term 
debt, net capital stock issuance, cash generated from cutting dividends and cash from investing 
and operating activities) was negative.
23 
5.2  Firms’ Financing and Investment Decisions during Recovery – US Case 
In this section we repeat the analysis in section 4.2 for the US case. We examine how positive 
and negative cash flow shocks affect firms’ investment, financing, and distribution decisions 
jointly, subject to the accounting identity that sources of cash equal uses of cash. We re-estimate 
the system of equations in (7) over 2006-2010 using a sample of US firms from Compustat. We 
start with the balanced sample of 3,338 firms and remove the top and bottom 1% outliers for all 
the variables in the system.  To estimate the effects during the crisis and recovery periods 
separately, we estimate the system by including four time dummies for 2006-2007 (pre-crisis 
period), 2008 (crisis year), 2009 (crisis year) and 2010 (recovery year) and interactions of 
Operating cash flow (OCF) with each of the four dummies.  In all regressions, we use de-meaned 
values of all variables (to proxy for firm fixed effects) and control for firm size (Log Total assets) 
and Tobin’s Q. The system is estimated as a seemingly unrelated regression (SURE) model 
subject to the constraints that across the system, in each year, the operating cash flow 
coefficients sum to one while the other coefficients sum to 0. That is,  
Σ Coefficient of OCF + Σ Coefficient of (OCF x 2006-2007 dummy) = 1;  
Σ Coefficient of OCF + Σ Coefficient of (OCF x 2008 dummy) = 1;  
Σ Coefficient of OCF + Σ Coefficient of (OCF x 2009 dummy) = 1;  
Σ Coefficient of OCF + Σ Coefficient of (OCF x 2010 dummy) = 1;   
                                                 
23 As is the practice in the literature (e.g. Gatchev, Pulvino and Tarhan, 2010), we replace missing data with zero to 
avoid dropping observations with missing Compustat variables . When we re-compute Table 4 after dropping 
observations with missing data on long-term borrowing, net capital stock issuance and other financing, our sample is 
reduced to 1609 firms of which 34.62% are candidate Phoenix miracles. When we examine alternate sources of 
credit and further drop observations with missing data on the different investing and operating activities in the 
Statement of Cash flows, our sample is reduced to 890 firms and we find that only 14.16% of the firms had a 




Σ Coefficients of Log Size =0;  
Σ Coefficients of Tobin’s Q=0; and  
Σ Coefficients of each of the time dummies =0. 
In Table 6, we report the combined effects of Operating cash flow and the interaction 
terms each year. Panel A reports the results from the SUREG system for the sample of firms with 
positive operating cash flows while panel B reports the results from the SUREG estimation for 
the sample of firms with negative operating cash flows. In unreported logit regressions, we find 
that larger firms are more likely to have positive operating cash flows than negative operating 
cash flows. 
Panel A shows that in the years before the crisis (2005-2007), a $1 increase in cash flow 
is associated with an increase in cash balances by 53.8 cents, increase in capital expenditures by 
17.2 cents, increase in other investments (including acquisitions) by 31.7 cents, increase of 0.4 
cents in dividends (insignificant) and a 5.3cents increase in share repurchases. The $1 increase in 
cash flow is also associated with an insignificant increases in asset sales, an increase in long-term 
debt by 5 cents, decrease in short-term debt by 3.8 cents, increase in equity issuance by 8.1 cents 
and a decrease in other financing by 0.9 cents. Thus, during the pre-crisis period we see that 
when there is a positive one dollar shock in cash flow, the use variables increase by $1.08 
(=0.538+0.172+0.317+0.004+0.053) and other sources variables also increase by $0.084 
(=0.050-0.038+0.081-0.009) thus summing the response across the system (Uses-Sources) to one 
dollar.  
When we look at the different uses of cash during the crisis and recovery periods, we find 
that firms facing a positive cash flow shock continue to add to their cash balances and make 
investments, although the capital expenditures are lower than pre-crisis levels. A $1 increase in 
cash flow results in an increase in cash savings of 58.1 cents in 2008, 70.9 cents in 2009 and 56.2 
cents in 2010. Increase in capital expenditures during crisis and recovery periods are lower than 
pre-crisis levels where as increase in other investments is about the same as pre-crisis levels. A 
$1 increase in cash flow is associated with an increase in capital expenditures of 14.4 cents in 
2008, 7.2 cents in 2009 and 10.2 cents in 2010 and an increase in other investments by 29.5 cents  
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in 2008, 23.7 cents in 2009 and 31.6 cents in 2010.
24 Increase in dividend payments are 1.7 cents 
in 2008, 2.8 cents in 2009 and 4.1 cents in 2010. Share repurchases increase by 5.5 cents in 2008, 
decrease by 2.3 cents in 2009 and there is an insignificant increase of 1.7 cents in 2010.  
We also find that firms facing positive cash flow shocks use their cash flows to reduce 
their short-term debt and other financing while raising equity. In 2008, increases in cash flow are 
associated with a decrease in short-term debt and other financing of 4 cents and 1.5 cents, 
respectively and an increase in long-term debt and equity of 5 cents and 9.7 cents, respectively. 
In 2009, increases in cash flow are associated with a decrease in short-term debt of 4 cents and 
an increase in equity issuances of 8 cents, respectively. Long-term debt and other financing 
decrease by insignificant amounts in 2009. In 2010, increases in cash flow are associated with a 
decrease in short-term debt and other financing of 2.3 cents and 1.3 cents, respectively and an 
increase in equity issuance by 10.8 cents. Note that not all equity issuances are issuances of new 
stock since the item includes conversion of special stock and/or debt into common stock, 
exercise of stock options and/or warrants and any stock splits/reverse stock splits associated with 
merger and acquisition activity. 
Panel B presents cash flow sensitivities for the firms facing adverse cash flow shocks. 
Note that the interpretation of the signs of the coefficients is switched here so that a negative 
coefficient means an increase in the dependent variable and a positive coefficient implies a 
decrease in the dependent variable. Overall, we find that firms facing adverse cash flow add to 
their cash balances during crisis and recovery periods, increase their capital expenditures and 
other investments, borrow long-term debt and issue equity while reducing their other financing. 
Specifically, when firms in our sample face a $1 shortfall in cash flow, they add 18.5 cents to 
their cash balances in 2006-07 (pre-crisis), 20 cents in 2008 and 23.6 cents in 2009 and 23.3 
cents in 2010. Increases in capital expenditure are 1.8 cents in 2006-07 and 2008, 2.2 cents in 
                                                 
24 As described in the Appendix, the Other Investments variable is computed from Compustat (for firms following 
cash flow format 7) as Acquisitions + (Increase in Investments – Sale of Investments) – Changes in Short-term 
Investments – Other investing Activities. Thus it includes the cash flow associated with mergers and acquisition 
activity. When we re-estimate the system by stripping the Other Investments variable of Acquisitions and including 
it as an independent variable, we find that over 50% of the Other Investments/Cash Flow sensitivity is due to 
Acquisitions. We don’t use this in all our regressions since we are unable to separate out acquisitions in the 
Bloomberg sample on emerging market sample.  
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2009 and 3 cents in 2010. Increases in other investments are 10 cents during pre-crisis levels, 6.2 
cents in 2009 and 12.4 cents in 2010.  
Firms facing adverse cash flow shocks of $1 borrow 9.3 cents of long-term debt during 
pre-crisis levels, 9.6 cents in 2008, 16.1 cents in 2009 and 2010. They also have large equity 
issuances in excess of $1 - $1.209 in 2006-07, $1.19 in 2008, $1.099 in 2009 and $1.241 in 2010. 
We find that the firms issuing equity and long-term debt are the larger firms in the sample of 
firms facing adverse cash flow shocks.
25 This is consistent with recent literature showing that 
equity is an important source of finance for firms facing substantial cash flow requirements (e.g. 
Huang, Mayer, and Sussman, 2008) and that unprofitable firms issue equity (e.g. Hovakimian, et 
al., 2004). Changes in short-term debt, dividends, asset sales, share repurchases for firms facing 
adverse cash flow shocks are not economically (all less than 1 cent) or statistically significant. 
The other variables in each of the regressions are Tobin’s Q and firm size and since these 
represent neither sources nor uses of funds, the sum of their coefficients should add up to zero in 
each case. The results suggest that in the positive cash flow sample, firms with higher Tobins Q 
add more to their cash balances, have higher capital expenditures and other investments and 
higher dividends and are more active in issuing equity. Larger firms also have higher capital 
expenditures and other investments and have larger long-term and short-term borrowing. We 
find similar results in the negative cash flow sample in addition to finding that that higher Tobins 
Q firms and larger firms also have lower asset sales (statistically significant at the 1% level). 
Panel C presents a summation of the cash flow coefficients in each year in each of the 
panels. As expected we find that each year, the sum of cash flow coefficients across the Sources 
(Cash, Capex, Other Investments, Dividends, Repurchases) – Uses (Asset Sales, Long-term Debt, 
Short-term Debt, Other Financing) sum to 1. When we compare the sum of cash flow 
coefficients across the investment variables (Capex + Other Investments – Asset Sales) to that 
across the financing variables (Long-term debt + Short-term debt + Equity + Other Financing – 
Repurchases) we see that for firms facing a positive cash flow shock, in each year, the 
investment cash flow sensitivities dominate the financing cash flow sensitivities. However, when 
we look at firms facing adverse cash flow shocks, we find that the financing cash flow 
                                                 
25 The large equity issuances coefficient in the sample is party driven by some firms having very small negative 
operating cash flows (the operating cash flows in this sample of 2972 firms range from -4.43 to -0.0001301).   
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sensitivities dominate the investment cash flow sensitivities. Thus financing variables seem to 
act as buffer against negative cash-flow changes, consistent with the notion that financing 
variables are less costly to adjust than investment variables (e.g. Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan, 
2010; Dasgupta, Noe, and Wang, 2011).  
5.2.1  Manufacturing vs. Non-manufacturing Firms 
In Table 7, we split the sample into manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. Thus we have 4 
panels – two panels on manufacturing (panel A1) and non-manufacturing (panel A2) sub-
samples for firms with positive operating cash flows and two panels on manufacturing (panel B1) 
and non-manufacturing (panel B2) sub-samples for firms with negative operating cash flows.  
For firms with positive operating cash flows we find that dollar increases in operating 
cash flow are associated with additions to cash balances and increases in investment 
expenditures across both manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. For every dollar increase 
in operating cash flow, manufacturing firms add between $0.427 to $0.719 to cash balances over 
2006-2010 while non-manufacturing firms add between $0.511 to $0.697 to cash balances over 
the same period. While both types of firms spend on capital expenditures and other investments 
out of positive cash flow shocks, on average non-manufacturing firms spend a higher amount on 
capital expenditures than manufacturing firms over the sample period. Sample statistics show 
that the capital expenditures in general are higher in the non-manufacturing firms in our sample 
(mean = 0.070, median = 0.044) than manufacturing firms (mean = 0.043, median = 0.029). 
Manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms also pay similar dividends during the crisis and 
recovery periods. For manufacturing firms, increases in cash flow are associated with increases 
in dividends of 1.3 cents in 2008, 2.5 cents in 2009 and 3 cents in 2010 compared to non-
manufacturing firms where increases in cash flow are associated with increases in dividends of 
2.2 cents, 3.2 cents and 5.1 cents in 2008, 2009, and 2010, respectively. 
On the financing side we find that in general, in both cases, positive increases in cash 
flow are associated with increases in equity issuances and decreases in short-term debt during the 
crisis and recovery periods. In the pre-crisis period, a $1 increase in cash flow is associated with 
reduction in short-term debt of 2.5 cents, reduction in other financing of 1.1 cents and increase in 
share repurchases of 7 cents for manufacturing firms. By contrast, for non-manufacturing firms,  
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a $1 increase in cash flow is associated with reduction in short-term debt of 4.5 cents, increase in 
long-term borrowing of 7.6 cents, increase in equity issuances of 13.9 cents and increase in share 
repurchases of 4.3 cents. In 2008, a $1 increase in cash flow is associated with increase in equity 
issuances of 9.8 cents, increase in share repurchases of 8.8 cents and decrease in other financing 
of 1.7 cents for manufacturing firms. For non-manufacturing firms in 2008, $1 increase in cash 
flow is associated with increase in long-term debt of 6.5 cents, decrease in short-term debt of 6.1 
cents, increase in equity issuances of 10.2 cents, decrease in other financing of 1.2 cents and 
increase in share repurchases of 3.8 cents. In 2009, the non-manufacturing firms reduce their 
short-term debt by 4.5 cents, increase their equity issuances by 10 cents and reduce share 
repurchases by 3.2 cents while manufacturing firms reduce short-term debt by 3.7 cents and 
increase equity issuances by 6 cents. During the recovery period in 2010, manufacturing use their 
positive cash flow shocks to repay long-term debt (10 cents), repay short-term debt (2.7 cents) 
and issue new equity (15.6 cents) while non-manufacturing firms use their positive cash flow 
shocks to repay short-term debt (2.3 cents), reduce other financing (1.7 cents) and issue new 
equity (6.9 cents) without any significant change in their long-term debt positions. 
As explained before, the interpretation of the coefficients in the negative cash flow 
sample is such that a negative sign indicates an increase and a positive sign indicates a decrease. 
Focusing on the firms facing adverse cash flow shocks in B1 and B2, we find that both 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms have increases in long-term debt and equity 
issuances over the entire period. They also have substantial addition to their cash balances and 
increases in capital expenditures and other investments suggesting that these firms may not be 
very financially constrained.  Focusing on the differences between manufacturing and non-
manufacturing firms we find that decreases in cash flow are associated with significant increases 
in dividend payments (although very small and ≤ 2 cents) only in the case of manufacturing 
firms in the pre-crisis period, 2009 and 2010 but not in the case of non-manufacturing firms. 
Manufacturing firms also have significant asset sales of 0.2 cents and 0.5 cents in 2008 and 2009 
while non-manufacturing firms do not. On the financing side, we find that manufacturing firms 
reduce short-term debt 2.1 cents in 2010 while non-manufacturing firms borrow 4.9 cents of 
short-term debt and 2.1 cents of other financing in 2010.  
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5.2.2  Miracle Firms vs. Non-Miracle Firms 
In this section we examine the differences in cash flow sensitivity between firms that were 
identified as candidate miracles or non-miracles in section 5.1. That is, we first identify the firms 
that had a zero/positive change in sales in 2010 while the change in short-term debt was 
zero/negative (i.e. candidate phoenix miracles). We next identify the cash flow sensitivities of 
these firms during the whole period. We also further split the miracles and non-miracles into 
those that had positive operating cash flows and those with negative operating cash flows. 
When we compare miracles and non-miracles that had positive operating cash flows in 
panels A1 and A2 of Table 8, we find that in both cases, increases in cash flow are associated 
with additions to cash balances, increases in capital expenditures and other investments, and 
increases in dividends over the crisis and recovery periods. On the financing side, we find that in 
the case of miracle firms, increases in cash flow are associated with increase in long-term debt of 
9.1 cents in the pre-crisis period and a decrease in long-term debt of 7.9 cents in 2010 while there 
are no significant changes in the non-miracle sample.  When we look at short-term debt, we find 
that increases in cash flow are associated with reduction in short-term debt in all years for the 
non-miracle sample but in the case of the miracle sample there is no significant reduction in 
short-term debt in 2010, as expected. In both cases, increases in cash flow are associated with 
increase in equity issuances through the entire sample period. However, there are some 
differences in the share repurchases. For miracle firms, increases in cash flow are associated with 
increase in share-repurchases only in the pre-crisis period where as for non-miracle firms, 
increases in cash flow are associated with increases in share-repurchases in the pre-crisis period 
and in 2008 and a reduction in share repurchases in 2009. Increases in cash flow are associated 
with a reduction in other financing in the pre-crisis years, 2008 and 2010 only for the miracle 
firms where as there are no significant changes in the non-miracle sample. 
When we look at firms with negative cash flows in panels B1 and B2, we find that 
miracles and non-miracles have similar increases in cash, capital expenditures and equity 
issuances. We also find that both miracle and non-miracles facing adverse cash flow shocks have 
increases in long-term borrowing over the period. We do find some differences in the short-term 
borrowing and other financing between miracles and non-miracles. Miracle firms facing a $1 
decrease in cash flow decrease their short-term borrowing by 1.7 cents in 2008 and 2.9 cents in  
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2010 with insignificant changes in other years where as the non-miracles facing a $1 decrease in 
cash flow shock increase their short-term borrowing by 2.3 cents in 2010 with insignificant 
changes in other years. Decreases in cash flow are also associated with decreases in other 
financing in the case of miracle firms of 0.7 cents in the pre-crisis period, 2.1 cents in 2008, 2.1 
cents in 2009 and 2.8 cents in 2010 where as decreases in cash flow seem to be associated with 
increases in other financing (although insignificant and ≤ 0.5 cents for non-miracle firms. 
Overall, we find no evidence that the candidate miracle firms are substantially different 
from the non-miracle firms in their investment and financing patterns. The miracle firms do not 
seem to be particularly more financially constrained than the non-miracle firms. 
Overall, the experience of US firms during the one-year recovery from the 2008 US 
financial crisis suggests the following: First most firms in our sample increase their equity 
issuances during the crisis and recovery periods. Second, increases in cash flow are associated 
with decreases in short-term leverage during the crisis and recovery period while decreases in 
cash flow are associated with increases in long-term debt. Third, while the cash savings of firms 
are lower compared to pre-crisis levels, there is still substantial addition to cash holdings during 
the recovery period among firms facing both positive and negative cash flow shocks. Fourth, it 
parallels the emerging market experience in that the recoveries do not appear to be credit-less 
since the firms facing adverse cash flow shocks and presumably the most financially constrained, 
are able to access external borrowing and issue equity. 
6.  Conclusion 
We provide empirical evidence on the effect of Systemic Sudden Stops (3S) on firms in 
developing countries. In an influential paper, Calvo et al. (2006a) argue that recovery from these 
financial crises by firms occurs before the recovery of the financial sector and outline a 
theoretical model of this recovery.  They term these credit-less recoveries as “Phoenix Miracles.” 
This position has significant policy implications for the role of credit markets in stimulating 
recovery from a financial crisis. 
While this thesis appears to be consistent with averaged macro data across a sample of 3S 
episodes, closer inspection reveals heterogeneity of responses across the countries, with only a 
minority fitting the pattern outlined by Calvo et al. (2006a). Our analysis of the recovery patterns  
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and sources of financing in the micro data shows that even in these countries only a small 
fraction of firms (<31%) follow this pattern. Moreover, most of these firms continue to spend on 
capital expenditures and other investments and have positive operating cash flow.  
When we examine the 2008 U.S. financial crisis, we find no evidence of a credit-less 
recovery at the macro or micro level. At the macro level we find that both GDP and aggregate 
Bank Credit recover simultaneously in 2009 as do aggregate Sales and Short Term Credit at the 
micro level. A detailed firm-level analysis shows that once we account for the different sources 
of external credit, only 9% of the firms in our sample are candidate Phoenix Miracles. In addition 
if we were to consider the cash that could have been saved by these firms by cutting dividends, 
capital expenditures, acquisitions and other investments and the cash from operating activities, 
only 2.8% of the firms in our sample appear to have a recovery in sales not accompanied by 
credit. Furthermore, we find that even the firms facing adverse cash flow shocks are able to issue 
equity and borrow in the long-term debt market during the recovery process.  The seeming 
continuing reliance on long term financing and equity issuance during crises episodes, as 
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Figure 1: Output and Credit Collapses during 3S episodes 
(A) Averages across 22 3S episodes                
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Figure 2: Macro Evidence - Heterogeneity across 3S episodes 
2A: Phoenix Miracles 
Argentina                        Indonesia                        Mexico 
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Real GDP Index Real Credit Index 
40 
 
2B: No Miracles 
         Korea                 Turkey 1994                 Turkey 1999  
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Figure 3: Recovery in Corporate Sales versus GDP 
 
(A) Average across all countries            (B) From t-6 to t+4   
                                      
 
     (C) Alternate Measures of Output          (D) Private Firms in Argentina
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Figure 4: Recovery in Corporate Sales versus GDP – Heterogeneity across Crises 
4A – Phoenix Miracles  
 
          Argentina          Indonesia                          Mexico 
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4B – No Miracles 
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Figure 5: Recovery in Corporate Sales versus Short Term Credit – Phoenix Miracles at the Micro Level 
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(B) Phoenix Miracles at the Macro and Micro Level 
Argentina                                        Malaysia           
                   
              Thailand                          Korea 





















































































































































































































































(C) Phoenix Miracles only at the Macro Level but not at the Micro-Level 




(D) No Phoenix Miracles at the Macro or Micro Level 
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Figure 6: The US Financial Crisis  
This figure shows patterns of output and credit at both the macro and micro levels from 2005-2010 in the United States. Figure 6A outlines GDP 
and Bank Credit and Figure 6B outlines aggregate Sales and Debt in Current Liabilities. GDP is annual real Gross Domestic Product in billions of 
chained 2005 dollars from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Bank Credit is the December values in each year, of the seasonally adjusted 
aggregate amount of assets held by all U.S. commercial banks and is sourced from statistical release H8 (Assets and Liabilities of Commercial 
Banks in the United States) of the Federal Reserve Board. Sales and Short-term borrowing are the aggregate sales and debt in current liabilities 
respectively, computed by summing across the sample of firms in Compustat database each year. 
 




































































































































Table 1: 3S Collapse Episodes over the 1990s 
This table presents the dates associated with the Sudden Systemic Stop (3S) episodes over the 1990s as outlined in 
Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006a). The pre-crisis peak is the year displaying the maximum level of output (GDP) 
preceding a trough, trough is the local minimum following the onset of a crisis and recovery point is the year in 
which the pre-crisis peak output level is fully restored. 
 
     
Dating of Output Collapse from 
Calvo et al. (2006) 
#   Country 
Pre-Crisis 
Peak  Trough 
Recovery 
Point 
1  Argentina  1998  2002  2004 
2  Indonesia  1997  1998  2003 
3  Malaysia  1997  1998  2000 
4  Mexico  1994  1995  1997 
5  Russia  1997  1998  1999 
6  South Korea  1997  1998  1999 
7  Thailand  1996  1998  2002 
8  Turkey (1992-1996)  1993  1994  1995 
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Table 2: Drop in GDP and Private Credit across the 3S Episodes 
Columns 1 and 2 provide the years in which GDP and Credit begin to recover in relation to time t, which is the local 
minimum following the onset of the 3S crisis episode. Columns 3 and 4 provide the percentage change in GDP and 
Credit respectively from the pre-crisis peak to the local minimum following the onset of the 3S episode. GDP is the 
real GDP in constant local currency units from World Development Indicators and Credit is the Claims on the 
Private Sector by Deposit Money Banks from the International Financial Statistics (line 22d) deflated by the 














Phoenix Miracles       
 
  
Argentina  T  T+1  -15%  -57% 
Indonesia  T  T+1  -13%  -69% 
Mexico  T  T+1  -6%  -52% 
Malaysia  T  T+1  -7%  -10% 
Russia  T  T+1  -5%  -17% 
Thailand  T  T+3  -12%  -38% 
        
 
  
Non- Miracles       
 
  
South Korea  T  T  -7%  - 
Turkey (1992-1996)  T  T  -5%  -17% 

























Table 3: Recovery from 3S episodes - Potential Phoenix Miracles in Emerging Market 3S Episodes 
 
In Panel A, we present the percentage of firms in each country that had a recovery (defined by a positive change) in sales over the period T to T+2, with T being 
the crisis trough. In Panel B, we identify four categories of firms based on their sales recovery and credit recovery -  the percentage of firms that had a zero or 
positive change in sales and a positive change in credit, a zero/positive change in sales while change in credit is zero/negative (these firms are candidate Phoenix 
Miracles), a negative change in sales while change in credit is positive, and a negative change in sales and a zero/negative change in credit. We use two 
definitions of changes in credit. In panel B1 we use Changes in Short-term borrowing and in panel B2, we use Changes in Short-term borrowing, changes in 
long-term debt (long-term debt issuance-long-term debt reduction), net capital stock issuance (equity issuance – repurchases), and other financing. In Panel C, we 
repeat the classification in panel B using two other definitions of credit. The definition in C1 includes the definition in B2 plus dividends, and cash from 
investing activities including sale of property, plant, and equipment, changes in investments, changes in short-term investments, and cash from other investing 
activities. In panel C2, we use the definition in C1 plus cash from operating activities. 
 








% of firms with 
recovery in sales 
from T to T+2 
% of firms with no 
recovery in sales 
from T to T+2 
Indonesia  Miracle  No (Recovery)  214  50.47  49.53 
Mexico  Miracle  No (No Recovery)  76  9.21  90.79 
Korea  No  Miracle  289  73.36  26.64 
Malaysia  Miracle  Miracle  474  51.90  48.10 
Thailand  Miracle  Miracle  273  65.20  34.80 
Micro Miracle Countries        1036  61.39  38.61 
Non-Micro Miracle Countries 
 
290  39.66  60.34 
Total        1326  56.64  43.36 
 
 
Panel B: Identifying Phoenix Miracles 
Country  Micro Classification 
Recovery in Sales and 
Credit 
Recovery in Sales 
Only 
(PHOENIX) 
No Recovery in Sales 
but Recovery in 
Credit 
No Recovery in Sales 
or Credit 
Panel B1: Credit is defined as Short-Term Borrowing  
Indonesia  No (Recovery)  10.75%  39.72%  8.41%  41.12% 
Mexico  No (No Recovery)  1.32%  7.89%  35.53%  55.26% 
Korea  Miracle  28.03%  45.33%  13.49%  13.15% 
Malaysia  Miracle  20.89%  31.01%  11.60%  36.50% 
Thailand  Miracle  20.51%  44.69%  13.19%  21.61% 
Total    19.61%  37.03%  13.20%  30.17%  
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Country  Micro Classification 
Recovery in Sales and 
Credit 
Recovery in Sales 
Only 
(PHOENIX) 
No Recovery in Sales 
but Recovery in 
Credit 
No Recovery in Sales 
or Credit 
Panel B2: Credit  is defined as Short-Term, Long-Term Borrowing, Net Capital Stock Issuance and Other Financing Activities 
Indonesia  No (Recovery)  18.22%  32.24%  14.02%  35.51% 
Mexico  No (No Recovery)  6.58%  2.63%  44.74%  46.05% 
Korea  Miracle  39.10%  34.26%  12.11%  14.53% 
Malaysia  Miracle  27.64%  24.26%  17.72%  30.38% 
Thailand  Miracle  23.44%  41.76%  10.99%  23.81% 
Total    26.55%  30.09%  16.06%  27.30% 
 
 
Panel C: Examining Other Sources of Credit 
Country  Micro Classification 
Recovery in Sales and 
Credit 
Recovery in Sales 
Only 
No Recovery in Sales 
but Recovery in 
Credit 
No Recovery in Sales 
or Credit 
Panel C1: Credit is defined as Short-Term, Long-Term Borrowing, Net Capital Stock Issuance, Other Financing Activities, Cash generated 
from cutting dividends and disposal of assets and Cash used for capital expenditures, net investments, acquisitions and other investing activities 
Indonesia  No (Recovery)  36.45%  14.02%  34.11%  15.42% 
Mexico  No (No Recovery)  9.21%  0.00%  76.32%  14.47% 
Korea  Miracle  68.86%  4.50%  24.22%  2.42% 
Malaysia  Miracle  45.99%  5.91%  40.51%  7.59% 
Thailand  Miracle  53.11%  12.09%  24.18%  10.62% 
Total    48.79%  7.84%  34.62%  8.75% 
Panel C2: Credit is defined as Short-Term, Long-Term Borrowing, Net Capital Stock Issuance, Other Financing Activities, Cash generated 
from cutting dividends and disposal of assets and Cash used for capital expenditures, net investments, acquisitions and other investing 
activities, and Cash from Operating Activities 
Indonesia  No (Recovery)  48.60%  1.87%  47.20%  2.34% 
Mexico  No (No Recovery)  7.89%  1.32%  90.79%  0.00% 
Korea  Miracle  72.32%  1.04%  25.95%  0.69% 
Malaysia  Miracle  49.58%  2.32%  41.56%  6.54% 
Thailand  Miracle  63.74%  1.47%  32.23%  2.56% 






Table 4: Cash Flow Sensitivities 
The table presents coefficient estimates of firm cash flow estimated by a system of equations.  The regression specification for the system of equations is 
Source/Use of cash = a + b1Operating Cash Flow + b2 Operating Cash Flow x Dummy for crisis year T (trough) + b3 Operating Cash Flow x Dummy for year 
(T+1) + b4 Operating Cash Flow x Dummy for year (T+2) + b5 Dummy for year (T) + b6 Dummy for year (T+1) + b7 Dummy for year (T+2) + b8 Q + b5Firm Size 
+ e. The dependent variable is any one of the following variables – Changes in Cash Holding, Capital Expenditures, Acquisitions, Other Investments, Dividends, 
Re-purchases, Asset Sales, Changes in Long-term debt, Changes in Short-term debt, Equity Issuances, and Other Financing. Operating Cash Flow is the cash 
flow from operating activities. Q is Tobin’s Q ratio. Size is log of Total Assets. All variables are demeaned values. The system is estimated as a seemingly 
unrelated regression model subject to the constraints that the operating cash flow coefficients across the system sum to one while the other coefficients sum to 0. 
Panel A presents results for the firms with positive cash flows and Panel B presents results for the firms with negative cash flows. Panel C presents the sum of 
cash flow coefficients across the sources and uses variables in panels A and B. The Data Appendix provides detailed definitions of each of the variables.  
 



















(T-2, T-1)  0.407***  0.107***  0.189***  0.006  -0.001  -0.006  -0.089***  -0.211***  0.040*  -0.027*** 
 
(0.027)  (0.027)  (0.024)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.030)  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.008) 
Crisis (T)  0.445***  0.095***  0.157***  -0.018***  -0.000  -0.012**  -0.086**  -0.191***  0.006  -0.037*** 
 
(0.032)  (0.032)  (0.028)  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.035)  (0.028)  (0.026)  (0.010) 
Recovery (T+1)  0.420***  0.156***  0.176***  0.013*  0.003**  -0.014***  -0.032  -0.187***  0.026  -0.025** 
 
(0.034)  (0.034)  (0.030)  (0.007)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.037)  (0.030)  (0.028)  (0.010) 
Recovery (T+2)  0.488***  0.260***  0.154***  0.054***  0.003**  0.007  0.023  -0.079**  0.025  -0.018 
   (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.033)  (0.007)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.041)  (0.033)  (0.031)  (0.011) 



















(T-2, T-1)  0.103**  -0.098***  0.080**  -0.015**  0.001  -0.004  -0.207***  -0.460***  -0.218***  -0.040*** 
 
(0.040)  (0.035)  (0.037)  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.007)  (0.051)  (0.043)  (0.050)  (0.014) 
Crisis (T)  0.238***  -0.047  0.044  0.003  -0.000  -0.007  -0.264**  -0.244**  -0.260**  0.014 
 
(0.089)  (0.077)  (0.081)  (0.014)  (0.003)  (0.015)  (0.113)  (0.095)  (0.111)  (0.031) 
Recovery (T+1)  0.198*  -0.033  0.132  -0.016  0.003  0.006  -0.544***  -0.260**  0.134  -0.053 
 
(0.107)  (0.092)  (0.097)  (0.016)  (0.003)  (0.018)  (0.135)  (0.114)  (0.133)  (0.037) 
Recovery (T+2)  0.376***  -0.057  0.061  0.030*  0.002  -0.041**  -0.156  -0.069  -0.242*  -0.081** 



















In Panel A:             
Pre-Crisis (T=-2, T=-1)  -0.293  0.707  0.302  -0.286 
Crisis (T=0)  -0.32  0.679  0.264  -0.308 
Recovery (T=1)  -0.232  0.768  0.346  -0.221 
Recovery (T=2)  -0.042  0.959  0.407  -0.052 
 
In Panel B:             
Pre-Crisis (T=-2, T=-1)  -0.929  0.071  -0.014  -0.926 
Crisis (T=0)  -0.761  0.238  0.004  -0.754 
Recovery (T=1)  -0.717  0.284  0.093  -0.276 
Recovery (T=2)  -0.589  0.412  0.045  -0.55 
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Table 5: Potential Phoenix Miracles in the US 
In Panel A, we present summary statistics on our sample of US firms that had a zero change in sales, a positive change in sales and a negative change in sales 
over the years 2008 to2009 and 2009 to 2010 respectively. In Panel B, we identify four categories of firms based on their sales recovery and credit recovery over 
2009 to 2010 -  the percentage of firms that had a zero or positive change in sales and a positive change in credit, a zero/positive change in sales while change in 
credit is zero/negative (these firms are candidate Phoenix Miracles), a negative change in sales while change in credit is positive, and a negative change in sales 
and a zero/negative change in credit. We use two definitions of changes in credit: We use Changes in Short-term borrowing and next expand this to also include 
changes in long-term debt (long-term debt issuance-long-term debt reduction), net capital stock issuance (equity issuance – repurchases), and other financing. In 
Panel C, we repeat the classification in panel B using two other definitions of credit. First, we use the expanded definition in panel B and further include 
dividends, and cash from investing activities including sale of property, plant, and equipment, changes in investments, changes in short-term investments, and 
cash from other investing activities. Next, we expand it further to include cash from operating activities. 
Panel A: Recovery of Firms 
   2008-2009  2009-2010 
   Number of firms  %  Number of firms  % 
Zero change in sales  109  3.27  115  3.45 
Positive Change in Sales  1090  32.65  2316  69.38 
Negative Change in Sales  2139  64.08  907  27.17 
Total  3338  100.00  3338  100.00 
 
Panel B: Identifying Phoenix Miracles 
















Changes in Short-term Debt  27.20%  45.63%  9.29%  17.88% 
Changes in Short-Term Debt, Changes in Long-Term Debt, Net Capital Stock Issuance, and 
Other Financing  63.87%  8.96%  24.18%  3.00% 
 
Panel C: Alternate Sources of Credit 





Sales Only  
No Recovery 







Changes in Short-Term Debt, Changes in Long-Term Debt, Net Capital Stock Issuance, Other 
Financing, Dividends, and Cash from Investing Activities   67.29%  5.54%  25.25%  1.92% 
 
Changes in Short-Term Debt, Changes in Long-Term Debt, Net Capital Stock Issuance, Other 




Table 6: Cash Flow Sensitivities – US firms 
The table presents coefficient estimates of firm cash flow estimated by a system of equations.  The regression specification for the system of equations is 
Source/Use of cash = a + b1Operating Cash Flow + b2 Operating Cash Flow x Dummy for year 2008+ b3 Operating Cash Flow x Dummy for year 2009 + b4 
Operating Cash Flow x Dummy for year 2010+ b5 Dummy for year 2008 + b6 Dummy for year 2009 + b7 Dummy for year 2010 + b8 Q + b5Firm Size + e. The 
dependent variable is any one of the following variables – Changes in Cash Holding, Capital Expenditures, Acquisitions, Other Investments, Dividends, Re-
purchases, Asset Sales, Changes in Long-term debt, Changes in Short-term debt, Equity Issuances, and Other Financing. Operating Cash Flow is the cash flow 
from operating activities. Q is Tobin’s Q ratio. Size is log of Total Assets. All variables are demeaned values. The system is estimated as a seemingly unrelated 
regression model subject to the constraints that the operating cash flow coefficients across the system sum to one while the other coefficients sum to 0. Panel A 
presents results for the firms with positive cash flows and Panel B presents results for the firms with negative cash flows. Panel C presents the sum of cash flow 
coefficients across the sources and uses variables in panels A and B. The Data Appendix provides detailed definitions of each of the variables.  
 



















(2006, 2007)  0.538***  0.172***  0.317***  0.004  0.053***  -0.000  0.050**  -0.038***  0.081***  -0.009*** 
 
(0.022)  (0.009)  (0.023)  (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.001)  (0.020)  (0.006)  (0.017)  (0.003) 
Crisis (2008)  0.581***  0.144***  0.295***  0.017***  0.055***  -0.001  0.050**  -0.040***  0.097***  -0.015*** 
 
(0.029)  (0.012)  (0.030)  (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.002)  (0.026)  (0.007)  (0.022)  (0.004) 
Crisis (2009)  0.709***  0.072***  0.237***  0.028***  -0.023**  -0.000  -0.014  -0.040***  0.080***  -0.002 
 
(0.029)  (0.012)  (0.030)  (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.002)  (0.026)  (0.007)  (0.022)  (0.004) 
Recovery 
(2010)  0.562***  0.102***  0.316***  0.041***  0.017  0.001  -0.034  -0.023***  0.108***  -0.013*** 
   (0.029)  (0.012)  (0.031)  (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.002)  (0.026)  (0.008)  (0.023)  (0.004) 
 



















(2006, 2007)  -0.185***  -0.018***  -0.100***  -0.001  0.000  -0.000  -0.093***  -0.001  -1.209***  0.000 
 
(0.024)  (0.004)  (0.016)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.012)  (0.005)  (0.030)  (0.003) 
Crisis (2008)  -0.200***  -0.018***  -0.062***  -0.000  0.001  -0.001*  -0.096***  0.001  -1.190***  0.006** 
 
(0.028)  (0.005)  (0.018)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.014)  (0.005)  (0.034)  (0.003) 
Crisis (2009)  -0.236***  -0.022***  0.007  -0.003***  -0.003  -0.004***  -0.161***  -0.000  -1.099***  0.007* 
 
(0.034)  (0.006)  (0.022)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.017)  (0.007)  (0.041)  (0.004) 
Recovery 
(2010)  -0.233***  -0.030***  -0.124***  -0.002**  -0.003  -0.001*  -0.161***  0.001  -1.241***  0.010** 
   (0.035)  (0.006)  (0.023)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.018)  (0.007)  (0.043)  (0.004)  
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In Panel A:             
Pre-Crisis (2006, 2007)  0.084  1.08  0.489  0.031 
Crisis (2008)  0.091  1.09  0.44  0.037 
Crisis (2009)  0.024  1.02  0.309  0.047 
Recovery (2010)  0.039  1.04  0.417  0.021 
 
In Panel B:             
Pre-Crisis (2006, 2007)  -1.303  -0.3  -0.118  -1.303 
Crisis (2008)  -1.28  -0.28  -0.079  -1.28 
Crisis (2009)  -1.257  -0.26  -0.011  -1.25 
Recovery (2010)  -1.392  -0.39  -0.153  -1.388 
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Table 7: Cash Flow Sensitivities – US firms: Manufacturing vs. Non-Manufacturing 
The table presents coefficient estimates of firm cash flow estimated by a system of equations.  The regression specification for the system of equations is 
Source/Use of cash = a + b1Operating Cash Flow + b2 Operating Cash Flow x Dummy for year 2008+ b3 Operating Cash Flow x Dummy for year 2009 + b4 
Operating Cash Flow x Dummy for year 2010+ b5 Dummy for year 2008 + b6 Dummy for year 2009 + b7 Dummy for year 2010 + b8 Q + b5Firm Size + e. The 
dependent variable is any one of the following variables – Changes in Cash Holding, Capital Expenditures, Acquisitions, Other Investments, Dividends, Re-
purchases, Asset Sales, Changes in Long-term debt, Changes in Short-term debt, Equity Issuances, and Other Financing. Operating Cash Flow is the cash flow 
from operating activities. Q is Tobin’s Q ratio. Size is log of Total Assets. All variables are demeaned values. The system is estimated as a seemingly unrelated 
regression model subject to the constraints that the operating cash flow coefficients across the system sum to one while the other coefficients sum to 0. Panel A1 
presents results for the manufacturing firms with positive cash flows and A2 presents results for non-manufacturing firms with positive cash flows. Panel B1 
presents results for the manufacturing firms with negative cash flows and B2 presents results for non-manufacturing firms with negative cash flows.  The Data 
Appendix provides detailed definitions of each of the variables.  
 
Panel A: POSITIVE CASH FLOWS 







Investments  Dividends 
Re-












2007)  0.427***  0.076***  0.389***  0.002  0.070***  0.001  0.007  -0.025***  -0.007  -0.011*** 
 
(0.033)  (0.011)  (0.036)  (0.004)  (0.013)  (0.002)  (0.030)  (0.009)  (0.025)  (0.004) 
Crisis (2008)  0.608***  0.084***  0.301***  0.013**  0.088***  0.000  0.028  -0.015  0.098***  -0.017*** 
 
(0.042)  (0.014)  (0.046)  (0.005)  (0.017)  (0.002)  (0.038)  (0.012)  (0.032)  (0.005) 
Crisis (2009)  0.719***  0.030**  0.247***  0.025***  -0.009  -0.001  -0.006  -0.037***  0.060*  -0.004 
 
(0.040)  (0.014)  (0.044)  (0.005)  (0.016)  (0.002)  (0.036)  (0.011)  (0.031)  (0.005) 
Recovery (2010)  0.615***  0.068***  0.310***  0.030***  0.000  0.001  -0.100***  -0.027**  0.156***  -0.006 
 
(0.042)  (0.014)  (0.045)  (0.005)  (0.016)  (0.002)  (0.037)  (0.012)  (0.032)  (0.005) 
A2: Non-Manufacturing Firms (Number of firm-years=5621) 
Pre-Crisis (2005-
2007)  0.608***  0.246***  0.257***  0.006  0.043***  -0.001  0.076***  -0.047***  0.139***  -0.007 
 
(0.030)  (0.014)  (0.031)  (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.002)  (0.027)  (0.007)  (0.023)  (0.004) 
Crisis (2008)  0.564***  0.201***  0.266***  0.022***  0.038***  -0.002  0.065*  -0.061***  0.102***  -0.012** 
 
(0.039)  (0.019)  (0.041)  (0.005)  (0.014)  (0.002)  (0.035)  (0.009)  (0.030)  (0.006) 
Crisis (2009)  0.697***  0.124***  0.216***  0.032***  -0.032**  -0.000  -0.019  -0.045***  0.100***  0.001 
 
(0.041)  (0.019)  (0.042)  (0.005)  (0.015)  (0.003)  (0.036)  (0.010)  (0.031)  (0.006) 
Recovery (2010)  0.511***  0.142***  0.310***  0.051***  0.033**  -0.000  0.018  -0.023**  0.069**  -0.017*** 
 
(0.041)  (0.020)  (0.043)  (0.005)  (0.015)  (0.003)  (0.037)  (0.010)  (0.032)  (0.006) 
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Panel B: NEGATIVE CASH FLOWS  







Investments  Dividends 
Re-












2007)  -0.175***  -0.015***  -0.124***  -0.001*  -0.000  -0.001  -0.070***  -0.007  -1.235***  -0.002 
 
(0.032)  (0.004)  (0.022)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.014)  (0.006)  (0.039)  (0.003) 
Crisis (2008)  -0.183***  -0.017***  -0.077***  -0.000  0.002  -0.002**  -0.095***  -0.007  -1.177***  0.004 
 
(0.035)  (0.004)  (0.024)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.016)  (0.006)  (0.042)  (0.003) 
Crisis (2009)  -0.278***  -0.014***  0.008  -0.002***  -0.004**  -0.005***  -0.095***  -0.007  -1.190***  0.006 
 
(0.043)  (0.005)  (0.029)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.019)  (0.008)  (0.052)  (0.004) 
Recovery (2010)  -0.255***  -0.022***  -0.161***  -0.002**  -0.001  -0.001  -0.141***  -0.021**  -1.284***  0.005 
 
(0.047)  (0.006)  (0.032)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.021)  (0.008)  (0.056)  (0.004) 
B2: Non-Manufacturing Firms (Number of firm years=1118) 
Pre-Crisis (2005-
2007)  -0.163***  -0.028***  -0.033  -0.000  0.001  0.002  -0.150***  0.009  -1.091***  0.007 
 
(0.036)  (0.009)  (0.021)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.022)  (0.009)  (0.044)  (0.005) 
Crisis (2008)  -0.286***  -0.017  -0.061**  0.000  0.003  0.001  -0.075**  0.023**  -1.321***  0.010 
 
(0.047)  (0.012)  (0.027)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.029)  (0.011)  (0.058)  (0.007) 
Crisis (2009)  -0.091*  -0.053***  -0.003  -0.004  0.001  0.001  -0.388***  0.021  -0.789***  0.006 
 
(0.054)  (0.014)  (0.031)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.033)  (0.013)  (0.066)  (0.008) 
Recovery (2010)  -0.140***  -0.052***  -0.060**  -0.002  -0.006  -0.002  -0.218***  0.049***  -1.109***  0.021*** 
   (0.051)  (0.014)  (0.030)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.032)  (0.013)  (0.063)  (0.008)  
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Table 8: Cash Flow Sensitivities – US firms: Miracles vs. Non-Miracles 
The table presents coefficient estimates of firm cash flow estimated by a system of equations.  The regression specification for the system of equations is 
Source/Use of cash = a + b1Operating Cash Flow + b2 Operating Cash Flow x Dummy for year 2008+ b3 Operating Cash Flow x Dummy for year 2009 + b4 
Operating Cash Flow x Dummy for year 2010+ b5 Dummy for year 2008 + b6 Dummy for year 2009 + b7 Dummy for year 2010 + b8 Q + b5Firm Size + e. The 
dependent variable is any one of the following variables – Changes in Cash Holding, Capital Expenditures, Acquisitions, Other Investments, Dividends, Re-
purchases, Asset Sales, Changes in Long-term debt, Changes in Short-term debt, Equity Issuances, and Other Financing. Operating Cash Flow is the cash flow 
from operating activities. Q is Tobin’s Q ratio. Size is log of Total Assets. All variables are demeaned values. The system is estimated as a seemingly unrelated 
regression model subject to the constraints that the operating cash flow coefficients across the system sum to one while the other coefficients sum to 0. Panel A1 
presents results for the miracle firms with positive cash flows and A2 presents results for non-miracle firms with positive cash flows. Panel B1 presents results 
for the miracle firms with negative cash flows and B2 presents results for non-miracle firms with negative cash flows.  Miracle firms are identified as those that 




Panel A: POSITIVE CASH FLOWS 







Investments  Dividends 
Re-












2007)  0.624***  0.181***  0.337***  -0.000  0.028**  0.002  0.091***  -0.039***  0.129***  -0.012*** 
 
(0.034)  (0.014)  (0.036)  (0.004)  (0.013)  (0.002)  (0.028)  (0.008)  (0.025)  (0.004) 
Crisis (2008)  0.646***  0.131***  0.320***  0.014***  0.014  -0.001  0.043  -0.029***  0.131***  -0.020*** 
 
(0.043)  (0.017)  (0.044)  (0.005)  (0.016)  (0.002)  (0.035)  (0.010)  (0.031)  (0.005) 
Crisis (2009)  0.784***  0.052***  0.218***  0.021***  -0.024  0.003  -0.021  -0.032***  0.108***  -0.007 
 
(0.043)  (0.017)  (0.045)  (0.005)  (0.016)  (0.002)  (0.036)  (0.010)  (0.032)  (0.005) 
Recovery (2010)  0.550***  0.078***  0.374***  0.042***  0.013  0.004*  -0.079**  -0.007  0.158***  -0.020*** 
 
(0.044)  (0.018)  (0.046)  (0.006)  (0.016)  (0.002)  (0.037)  (0.010)  (0.033)  (0.005) 
A2: Non-Miracles (Number of firm-years = 5470) 
Pre-Crisis (2005-
2007)  0.463***  0.162***  0.299***  0.009**  0.079***  -0.002  0.017  -0.036***  0.038*  -0.005 
 
(0.028)  (0.013)  (0.030)  (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.002)  (0.028)  (0.008)  (0.023)  (0.004) 
Crisis (2008)  0.499***  0.161***  0.271***  0.020***  0.098***  -0.001  0.038  -0.047***  0.064**  -0.006 
 
(0.039)  (0.018)  (0.042)  (0.005)  (0.015)  (0.003)  (0.038)  (0.011)  (0.031)  (0.006) 
Crisis (2009)  0.630***  0.090***  0.263***  0.035***  -0.031**  -0.003  -0.011  -0.054***  0.054*  0.002 
 
(0.038)  (0.017)  (0.041)  (0.005)  (0.015)  (0.002)  (0.037)  (0.011)  (0.030)  (0.006) 
Recovery (2010)  0.589***  0.125***  0.275***  0.035***  0.015  -0.003  0.023  -0.031***  0.058*  -0.006 
 
(0.039)  (0.018)  (0.042)  (0.005)  (0.015)  (0.003)  (0.038)  (0.011)  (0.031)  (0.006) 
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Panel B: NEGATIVE CASH FLOWS 







Investments  Dividends 
Re-












2007)  -0.159***  -0.009  -0.098***  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.038**  0.007  -1.241***  0.007** 
 
(0.036)  (0.005)  (0.024)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.017)  (0.006)  (0.044)  (0.003) 
Crisis (2008)  -0.187***  -0.006  -0.101***  0.000  -0.001  0.001  -0.070***  0.017**  -1.263***  0.021*** 
 
(0.051)  (0.008)  (0.034)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.024)  (0.009)  (0.062)  (0.004) 
Crisis (2009)  -0.226***  -0.025***  0.019  -0.003***  -0.002  -0.002*  -0.099***  0.001  -1.159***  0.021*** 
 
(0.049)  (0.008)  (0.034)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.023)  (0.008)  (0.060)  (0.004) 
Recovery (2010)  -0.226***  -0.031***  -0.121***  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.085***  0.029***  -1.351***  0.028*** 
 
(0.057)  (0.009)  (0.039)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.027)  (0.010)  (0.070)  (0.005) 
B2: Non-Miracles (Number of firm-years = 1722) 
Pre-Crisis (2005-
2007)  -0.218***  -0.031***  -0.103***  -0.001  -0.000  0.000  -0.157***  -0.011  -1.178***  -0.007* 
 
(0.034)  (0.006)  (0.022)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.017)  (0.007)  (0.041)  (0.004) 
Crisis (2008)  -0.214***  -0.028***  -0.046**  -0.000  0.002  -0.002**  -0.126***  -0.010  -1.144***  -0.004 
 
(0.033)  (0.006)  (0.021)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.017)  (0.007)  (0.040)  (0.004) 
Crisis (2009)  -0.269***  -0.016*  -0.017  -0.003**  -0.004  -0.007***  -0.223***  0.006  -1.077***  -0.009 
 
(0.048)  (0.009)  (0.030)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.025)  (0.010)  (0.057)  (0.006) 
Recovery (2010)  -0.262***  -0.029***  -0.133***  -0.003**  -0.004  -0.001  -0.227***  -0.023**  -1.175***  -0.005 
 
(0.045)  (0.008)  (0.029)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.023)  (0.010)  (0.054)  (0.006) 
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Data Appendix: Variable Construction and Definitions 
 
Panel A: Emerging Market Sample 
Variable  Bloomberg Mnemonic 
Table 3 
  All variables below are deflated by Consumer Price Index to obtain real values 
Sales 
 
Change in sales (SALES_REV_TURN) 
 
Short-term debt  Increases/Decreases in short-term borrowing (CF_INCR_ST_BORROW) 
Long-term debt 
 




Net Capital Stock Issuance 
 









Cash dividends (CF_DVD_PAID) 
 
Cash from Investing Activities 
Proceeds from sale of long-term investments that are carried at cost or market (CF_DECR_INVEST) – 
Purchase of long-term investments that are carried at cost or market (CF_INCR_INVEST) + Disposal of 
fixed assets(CF_DISP_FIX_ASSET) + Capital Expenditures/Property Additions 
(CF_CAP_EXPEND_PRPTY_ADD)+ Other Investing Activities (CF_OTHER_INV_ACT)  
 





(Total Assets (BS_TOT_ASSET) + Last Price(PX_LAST)*Common Shares Outstanding(BS_SH_OUT)- 
Total Common Equity(TOT_COMMON_EQY) )/ Total Assets (BS_TOT_ASSET) 
 
All variables below are deflated by lagged Total Assets (data6) 
Changes in Cash 
 




Capital Expenditures/Property Additions (CF_CAP_EXPEND_PRPTY_ADD) 
 
Other Investments 
Proceeds from sale of long-term investments that are carried at cost or market (CF_DECR_INVEST) + 
Purchase of long-term investments that are carried at cost or market (CF_INCR_INVEST) + Other 
Investing Activities (CF_OTHER_INV_ACT)  
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Dividends  Cash dividends (CF_DVD_PAID) 
Re-purchases  Decreases in capital stock (CF_DECR_CAP_STOCK) 
Asset Sales  Disposal of fixed assets(CF_DISP_FIX_ASSET) 
Equity Issuances  Increases in capital stock (CF_INCR_CAP_STOCK) 
Other Financing  Other financing Activities (CF_OTHER_FNC_ACT) 
Cash from Operations  Cash from Operating Activities (CF_CASH_FROM_OPER) 
 
 
Panel B: U.S. Sample 
Variable  Compustat Item # (Cash Flow Format 7) 
Table 5 
  Sales  change in sales (data12) 
Short-term debt  change in debt in current liabilities (data34) 
Long-term debt  change in long-term debt (data9) 
Net Capital Stock Issuance 
change in book equity – change in retained earnings (data36), where book equity is 
measured as total assets (data6) – total liabilities (data181) – preferred stock (data10) + deferred taxes 
(data35) + convertible debt (data79). When preferred stock is missing, redemption value of preferred 
stock (data56) is used instead 
Other Financing  financing Activities-other (SCF data312) 
Dividends  cash dividends (SCF data127) 
Cash from Investing 
Activities 
sale in investments(data109) - increase in investments (data113) + sale of property, plant, and 
equipment (data107) + changes in short-term investments (SCF data309) + capital expenditures (SCF 
data 128)+ acquisitions (SCF data129) +  other investing activities 
Cash from Operations  operating activities (SCF data 308) 
Table 6 
  All variables below are deflated by lagged Total Assets (data6) 
Changes in Cash  Cash and Cash Equivalents - Inc/Decrease (data 274) 
Capital Expenditures  Capital Expenditures (SCF data 128) 
Other Investments 
Increase in investments (data113)+ Acquisitions (SCF data129) –Sale of  investments(data109)  - 
Changes in short-term investments (SCF data309) - Other investing activities (SCF data 310) 
Dividends  Cash dividends (SCF data127) 
Re-purchases  Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock (data 115)  
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Asset Sales  Sale of Property, Plant, and Equipment (data 107) 
Equity Issuances  Sale of Common and Preferred Stock (data 108) 
Other Financing  financing Activities-other (SCF data312) 
Tobin's Q 
Total Assets (data6)+Price-Close(data24)*Common Shares Outstanding(data25)- Total Common 
Equity(data60) 
Operating Cash Flow  Cash Flow from operating activities (SCF data 308) 
 